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Alimony: What Social Science and Popular Culture Tell Us About 
Women, Guilt, and Spousal Support After Divorce  
JUDITH G. MCMULLEN* 
ABSTRACT 
Over the past few decades, fewer divorcing women have received alimony, and when 
alimony awards are made, they are in declining amounts and for shorter periods of time.  
Conventional explanations of this trend focus on legal changes that have made divorces 
easier to obtain, as well as social changes that have led to larger numbers of married 
women in the paid workforce, and to greater social tolerance of divorce.  Certainly these 
changes partly explain the downward trend in alimony, but they do not fully explain 
why alimony awards continue to decline, even among women who do not have viable job 
skills at the time of divorce and who experience severe post-divorce financial hardship. 
This article looks to the women themselves and uses social science research to 
examine gender differences in emotional reactions to marriage and divorce.  The article 
argues that women’s tendency to assume emotional responsibility for the success of the 
marriage and parenting, and in particular women’s greater susceptibility to feelings of 
guilt and shame about divorce and parenting, make it difficult for many women to 
successfully negotiate for alimony.  Further, the article looks at women’s feelings and 
behaviors in negotiation situations, arguing that social pressures exacerbate the feelings 
of guilt over the divorce and lead women to accept unfavorable outcomes.  Ultimately, 
this article concludes that the legal system may need to impose solutions, such as 
mandatory pre-nuptial agreements or alimony formulas, in order to achieve a degree of 
predictability and fairness in alimony outcomes. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Alimony1—a stream of income paid by one ex-spouse to another—is 
frequently discussed in media stories about divorces of the rich and famous.  
Camille Grammer, a “Real Housewives of Beverly Hills” star and ex-wife of actor 
Kelsey Grammer, may be getting as much as $50 million dollars in her divorce.2  
Ms. Grammer, a mother of two who was married to Mr. Grammer for thirteen 
years, previously rejected a settlement offer of $30 million because the offer did 
not include alimony or child support.3  In another story, it is reported that movie 
 
 *   Professor of Law, Marquette University; B.A, University of Notre Dame; J.D., Yale Law 
School. 
 1.  Support paid by one ex-spouse to the other ex-spouse may be referred to as spousal support, 
spousal maintenance, maintenance, or alimony.  I use the traditional—and shorter—term “alimony” 
throughout this article. 
 2.  Camille Grammer Could Get $50 Million in Divorce, THE SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, Jan. 1, 
2011, at A2. 
 3.  Id. 
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star Michael Douglas is being taken to court by his ex-wife, Diandra Davis, who 
claims she is entitled to half of his income from Wall Street: Money Never Sleeps.4  
Still other juicy tidbits of information surround golfer Tiger Woods who is 
allegedly paying $100 million to his ex-wife, Elin, who will also receive custody 
of the couple’s two children.5  Steep alimony payments by celebrities have been 
reported for decades, and examples of conflicts and resentment over the 
payments abound.  Tony Curtis’s obituary notes that he blamed his long career 
slump in the 1970s on his cocaine and alcohol addictions, which he said were 
fueled, at least in part, by rage over alimony payments he had to make to his 
many ex-wives.6 
Meanwhile, the alimony experience of ordinary citizens is more nuanced.  
Awards of alimony are theoretically ordered when one spouse has greater need, 
the other spouse has the ability to pay, and payment is deemed to be fair in some 
sense.7  The terms “need,” “ability,” and “fair” are highly subjective in this 
context.  In some states—or at least in some states’ courtrooms—litigants who are 
far from rich and famous may be ordered to pay long-term or permanent 
alimony, even if their marriages were of short duration, and even if their ex-
spouses are employed.  For example, in an article discussing proposed changes 
to Massachusetts divorce law, The Boston Globe interviewed several long-time 
alimony payers.8  One interviewee, Steve Niro, was married to his first wife in 
1981 and divorced after less than five years of marriage.9  Despite the fact that 
Niro remarried over fifteen years ago, and that the children from his first 
marriage are all adults and out of school, he still must pay alimony to his first 
wife, Carol.10  In fact, two years prior to the newspaper interview, the judge 
raised his alimony payments from sixty-five dollars per week to seven hundred 
dollars per week.11  Niro argued that Carol had plenty of opportunity to retool 
herself for the job market after their youngest child (now twenty-five) went off to 
college; Carol’s lawyer argued that her child-rearing gave Niro an uninterrupted 
chance to develop his career.12  The Globe article cited other payers, including 
Rudolph Pierce, who was ordered to pay $110,000 per year in alimony after he 
was divorced from his wife of thirty-two years.13  When Pierce retired, a judge 
reduced the payment to $42,000 per year despite the fact that his ex-wife was 
 
 4.  Lynn Crosbie, Michael Douglas Battles Another Cancer–the Ex, THE GLOBE & MAIL (Canada), 
Aug. 30, 2010, available at http://m.theglobeandmail.com/news/arts/lynn-crosbie/michael-douglas-
battles-another-cancer-the-spiteful-ex/article1690421/?service=mobile. 
 5.  Guy Adams, Out of the Woods: Tiger’s Wife Elin to Bag $100 Million and Custody in Divorce 
Settlement, INDEP. (London), July 4, 2010, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/ 
out-of-the-woods-tiger-wife-elin-to-bag-100m-and-custody-in-divorce-settlement-2017909.html. 
 6.  Adam Bernstein, Iconic Actor Battled Addiction, then Became a Painter, WASH. POST, Oct. 1, 
2010, at B7. 
 7.  See, e.g., In re Marriage of LaRoque, 406 N.W.2d 736, 740 (Wis. 1987). 
 8.  Bella English, Years and Marriages Later, They Still Pay, THE BOSTON GLOBE, July 18, 2010, 
http://web.archive.org/web/20100720100245/http://www.boston.com/lifestyle/family/articles/2
010/0 7/18/years_and_marriages_later_former_spouses_still_owe_alimony/. 
 9.  Id. 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Id. 
McMullen_Paginated (Do Not Delete) 3/13/2012  10:14 AM 
 WOMEN, GUILT, AND SPOUSAL SUPPORT AFTER DIVORCE 43 
earning $95,000 per year at the time of his retirement and had over $1 million in 
assets.14  Pierce and his ex-wife later came to an agreement in which he no longer 
paid alimony.15 
In contrast, there are reports demonstrating that many people who appear 
to be natural candidates for substantial or permanent support are not awarded 
alimony.  Consider the case of Terry Hekker, a woman served with divorce 
papers on her 40th wedding anniversary.16  Ironically, she was well known for a 
New York Times OpEd piece that evolved into a book which claimed that being 
a housewife was a noble and desirable profession.17  Hekker describes her 
disillusionment in a post-divorce OpEd piece.18  “I was stunned to find myself, at 
this stage of life, marooned,” she writes.19  “And it was small comfort that I 
wasn’t alone.  There were many other confused women of my age and 
circumstance who’d been married just as long, sharing my situation.”20  She 
describes her financial woes, noting bitterly that while her ex-husband got to 
take his new girlfriend to Cancun, she was eligible for food stamps and had to 
sell her engagement ring in order to pay for roof repairs.21  She laments: “The 
judge had awarded me alimony that was less than I was used to getting for 
household expenses, and now I had to use that money to pay bills I’d never seen 
before: mortgage, taxes, insurance and car payments.  And that princely sum was 
awarded for only four years, the judge suggesting that I go for job training when 
I turned sixty-seven.”22 
The above examples illustrate the subjective, complicated, and 
unpredictable nature of alimony decisions.  They also demonstrate the 
frustration and unhappiness that can result from ill-defined and inconsistently 
applied policies. 
This paper examines the current state of alimony in the United States in a 
way that explores the subjective standards and unpredictable results in alimony 
disputes, and it tries to make sense of current alimony patterns by examining the 
psychological states of divorce litigants.  The article will begin by discussing the 
evolution of alimony and will revisit a fairly traditional analysis that suggests 
alimony has gradually diminished as expectations about marriage have changed 
and women have gained greater opportunities in the workplace.  It then 
discusses research published in sociological and psychological literature that 
gives greater insight into psychological reasons for alimony’s decline.  Here the 
article focuses on the emotional facets of divorce, particularly for women, and 
will argue that divorcing women experience strong feelings of guilt and shame 
 
 14.  Id. 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  Terry Martin Hekker, Op-Ed., Paradise Lost (Domestic Division), N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2006, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/01/fashion/sundaystyles/01LOVE.html?pagewanted=all. 
 17.  Id.  See also TERRY MARTIN HEKKER, EVER SINCE ADAM & EVE (1980).  Hekker also has a new 
book entitled DISREGARD FIRST BOOK, which cautions young women not to follow her risky example.  
TERRY MARTIN HEKKER, DISREGARD FIRST BOOK (2009). 
 18.  Hekker, supra note 16. 
 19.  Id. 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Id. 
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which impair their ability to pursue alimony, thus contributing to a low 
likelihood of receiving it.  This article contends that these feelings of guilt and 
shame contribute to gender differences in negotiating behavior that jeopardize 
fair settlements for some divorcing women.  The article concludes with a brief 
description of three possible changes in the law: the abolition of alimony, the 
requirement of pre-nuptial agreements, and alimony formulas.  Alimony 
formulas, already in operation in several jurisdictions, have the most potential 
for alleviating some of the unpredictability and unfairness often found in cases 
where alimony is an issue. 
II. DECLINE IN ALIMONY 
This section examines the history of alimony and discusses research 
showing that, in recent decades, alimony, while never granted in the majority of 
cases, has been awarded even less frequently, in smaller amounts, and for briefer 
periods of time.  This section also discusses the continuing problems of vague 
standards for awards and unpredictable outcomes in cases where alimony is in 
dispute.  Finally, this section examines social trends in marriage that have likely 
affected expectations and behavior of both litigants and other interested parties 
(such as judges and lawyers) at the time of a divorce. 
A. The Rise and Fall of Alimony Awards 
Alimony has its roots in a time when divorce was essentially impossible, 
and husbands owned all the property and controlled all the income.23  In extreme 
cases involving infidelity or desertion by the husband, a court could grant a 
“Divorce from Bed and Board” authorizing the spouses to live apart, but the 
husbands remained legally responsible for the financial support of their wives 
even if the couple was officially separated.24  The husband’s payment of support 
during separation was the original form of alimony.25 
Once divorce became possible for ordinary couples, the notion of continuing 
spousal support remained, despite its conceptual inconsistency with the idea that 
divorce represents a fresh start for ex-spouses.26  Alimony was awarded to the 
wife, however, only if she was the “innocent” party in the divorce and her 
husband was “guilty” of infidelity, cruelty, or other behavior leading to the 
demise of the marriage.27  When determining the amount of the award, courts 
looked at fault, the amount of property the wife brought into the marriage, the 
wife’s needs, and the husband’s station in life.28  Sometimes husbands lacked the 
 
 23.  Robert W. Kelso, The Changing Social Setting of Alimony Law, 6 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 186, 
187 (1939), available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/1189356. 
 24.  Id. 
 25.  Id. at 191–92. 
 26.  Grace Ganz Blumberg, The Financial Incidents of Family Dissolution, in CROSS CURRENTS: 
FAMILY LAW IN ENGLAND AND THE UNITED STATES SINCE WORLD WAR II, 387, 393–392 (Sanford N. 
Katz, John Eekelaar & Mavis Maclean eds., 2000) (describing this evolution in the context of the 
Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act). 
 27.  Marsha Garrison, “Good Intentions Gone Awry: The Impact of New York’s Equitable Distribution 
Law on Divorce Outcomes, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 621, 626–27 (1991). 
 28.  Id. at 627. 
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income to adequately compensate their wives with alimony for property brought 
into the marriage, and some courts began using distributions of property to 
remedy situations where a husband could not, or would not, pay sufficient 
alimony to support an ex-wife.29  This new concept of equitable property 
distribution allowed courts to distribute property to needy wives and ignore the 
fact that property was almost invariably titled in the husband’s name.30 
Despite the fact that courts could use property distribution to fashion 
individualized divorce outcomes,  wives were often not seen as having a just 
claim at divorce to property purchased with the husband’s income, or titled in 
the husband’s name, until the 1960s and 1970s.31  In the absence of any property 
rights, a divorcing woman’s only possible claim for economic benefits took the 
form of alimony.32  Beginning in the late 1960s, reformers worked for the 
abolition of fault as a basis for granting divorces, and they urged the use of 
property division, rather than alimony, to assure fair economic decisions in the 
divorce.33  Reformers claimed that property division could achieve fairer results 
in a divorce because one could not count on either the award of alimony or on its 
payment.34  Reformers succeeded in removing the requirement of proving fault 
in order to receive a divorce or as a basis for awards of property or support, and 
they also accomplished the goal of making receipt of marital property the main 
economic entitlement of a divorcing wife.35  Alimony became less important both 
in theoretical and practical terms, but no state actually abolished it because 
“reformers realized that women were not equals in the marketplace, and that 
need thus could not be ignored as a factor in divorce decision making.”36 
After the divorce reforms of the 1960s and 1970s, both property distribution 
and alimony awards were awarded on a flexible basis, taking into consideration 
need and spousal behavior.37  Although alimony was not awarded in the 
majority of cases, alimony awards became even less common as the justification 
for awards became more complicated.38  Law professor Marsha Garrison cited 
data showing low rates of alimony throughout the twentieth century, with cases 
involving alimony awards amounting to only about 25 percent of all divorce 
cases.39  Naturally, an award did not guarantee payment, and many women 
 
 29.  Id. 
 30.  Id. at 628. 
 31.  See generally, LESLIE JOAN HARRIS, LEE E. TEITELBAUM & JUNE CARBONE, FAMILY LAW 398 (3d 
ed. 2005) [Hereinafter HARRIS, TEITELBAUM & CARBONE] (describing rules of property division at 
divorce). 
 32.  Garrison, supra note 27, at 629. 
 33.  Id. at 629. 
 34.  Id. at 629–30.  “Surveys consistently showed that no more than a quarter of divorced wives 
were awarded alimony and that even fewer actually received payments.  Alimony critics—including 
many feminists and women’s advocates—also urged that the traditional emphasis on fault and need 
in setting alimony awards perpetuated traditional notions of women as dependents and failed to 
recognize the value of a wife’s contributions as a homemaker and parent.”  Id. 
 35.  Id. at 628–31. 
 36.  Id. at 630. 
 37.  Id. at 630–31. 
 38.  Id. at 628–33. 
 39.  Id. at n.27 (citing PAUL H. JACOBSON, AMERICAN MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 127–28 (1959)) 
(reporting that 9.3 percent of U.S. divorces included provisions for permanent alimony between 1887 
McMullen_Paginated (Do Not Delete) 3/13/2012  10:14 AM 
46 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY Volume 19:41 2011 
never received the amounts ordered.40  Garrison compared divorce outcomes in 
1978 cases to outcomes in 1984 cases in three New York counties to assess the 
impact of New York’s 1980 equitable distribution law.41  Her study found clear 
trends in alimony awards: 
In contrast to the relative stability in property distribution before and after the 
equitable distribution law, dramatic change in the frequency and duration of 
alimony awards occurred after the passage of the new law.  Over the research 
period, the proportion of cases in which alimony was awarded in the three 
research counties declined by fully 43 percent.  This decline was statistically 
significant and occurred consistently in all case categories and counties. . . An 
even more dramatic change occurred in the duration of alimony awards. . . In 
1978 approximately four out of five alimony awards were permanent.  In 1984 
about half that number were; the majority of awards were for a limited duration.  
The change was, again, statistically significant and consistent across case 
categories and across counties.42 
Other studies confirm that the decline in alimony awards is a continuing 
phenomenon.  For example, in a study of 2005 divorce cases in Waukesha 
County, Wisconsin, Debra Oswald and I found that alimony was awarded in 
only 8.6 percent of the cases.43  Of these, 58 percent were for a set number of 
months (with a mean duration of 60.69 months), and 17 percent were permanent 
awards.44  Another 8 percent of the awards were payable until certain conditions 
were fulfilled, such as graduating from school, selling the family home, or 
obtaining employment.45 
Alimony now represents neither a duty of the husband nor an entitlement 
of the wife.  Courts have the power to order alimony in any circumstances where 
one spouse (usually the wife) has need and the other spouse (usually the 
husband) has the ability to pay.46  The general rule is that only spouses of “long-
term” marriages are eligible for court-ordered alimony, but “long-term” is not 
specifically defined.47  Courts do not look only at a marriage’s longevity in 
 
and 1906, that alimony/property settlement awards for 13 states ranged from 10.7 percent (Florida) 
to 42.2 percent (Nebraska) around 1939 and from 7.2 percent (Florida) to 48.4 percent (Kansas) 
around 1950, and concluding that “alimony or property settlement awards are now made in about 
one fourth of the marriages dissolved in the United States”). 
 40.  Id. at 629–30. 
 41.  See generally id. 
 42.  Id. at 697–98. 
 43.  Judith G. McMullen & Debra Oswald, Why Do We Need a Lawyer?: An Empirical Study of 
Divorce Cases 12 J. L. FAM. STUD. 57, 75 (2010).  Another 2.6 percent received “family support,” which 
is a hybrid of alimony and child support under Wisconsin law.  Id.  Our study looked at 567 cases, a 
random sample from Waukesha County, WI, a county with a significantly above average median 
income which meant that in many cases, a lack of alimony was for reasons other than poverty.  Id. 
 44.  Id. 
 45.  Id. at 75. 
 46.  See, e.g., In re Marriage of LaRoque, 406 N.W.2d 736, 739–40 (Wis. 1987). 
 47.   I have found no authoritative definition of what makes a marriage “long.”  Indeed, judges 
exercise their discretion to find marriages of varying lengths long enough to justify an alimony 
award, an exercise of the “I’ll know it when I see it” variety.  The McMullen-Oswald study used 
fifteen years, or nearly twice the average marriage length of eight years, to denote a long marriage.  
Id. at n.66. 
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making alimony determinations.  Legislatures have produced long lists of factors 
for the court’s consideration, and doctrines have evolved to allow alimony to be 
used for purposes other than only keeping divorced women out of dire 
poverty.48 
Courts and legislatures struggle to justify alimony, even as they award it 
less frequently, in lesser amounts, and for shorter periods of time.49  The case law 
has evolved in a way that allows spousal maintenance payments to be used for 
rehabilitation or restitution.50  In addition, as Susan Moller Okin explains, in 
order to obtain alimony, the burden of proof fell on the woman who suddenly 
had to prove that she could not support herself.51  Rehabilitation means bringing 
the lower earning spouse to the point where she can support herself at the 
marital standard of living, while restitution means giving the lower earning 
spouse a stream of income that would partly make up for the loss of the marriage 
and the expected economic benefit she would have received from her own 
investment in the well-being of her husband and children.52  Alimony awards 
are, at least in theory, made with a view towards balancing the desire for a fresh 
start with the interest in bringing the lower-earning spouse up to the marital 
standard of living, or at least equalizing any drops in standard of living between 
the parties.53  To the extent that alimony is used for rehabilitation or restitution, 
however, it is supposed to be awarded only until the objective is reached, with 
permanent alimony becoming more and more exceptional.54 
As long as women earn less on average than men, and as long as women 
continue to elect to stay home with young children to a greater extent than do 
men, it would seem that alimony would have a robust status in divorce cases.  
This has not been the case.  The few empirical studies conducted on this topic 
show that alimony is awarded in only a small minority of cases, and the amounts 
and duration of the awards have become increasingly modest.55 
This reduction in amounts and duration of alimony awards appears to be 
 
 48.  For example, a court has discretion to order alimony to fund education for an ex-wife so that 
she will be able to support herself at a standard of living more similar to that enjoyed during 
marriage rather than merely at a subsistence level.  See, e.g., LaRoque, 406 N.W.2d.at 742. 
 49.  Garrison, supra note 27, at 633–36.  “[N]o clear consensus has emerged on the merits of equal 
property distribution as compared to equitable, or on standards for the determination of alimony 
awards.”  Id. at 636. 
 50.  “Although courts in most states retain discretion in matters of spousal support, most states 
now regard alimony as rehabilitative and short term.”  Mark A. Fine & David R. Fine, An Examination 
and Evaluation of Recent Changes in Divorce Laws in Five Western Countries: The Critical Role of Values, 56 
J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 249, 254 (1994) (citing MARY ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY 
LAW: STATE, LAW, AND FAMILY IN THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE (1989) and S.M. Oster,  A 
Note on the Determinants of Alimony, 49 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 81, 81–86 (Feb. 1987)). 
 51.  SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY 164 (1989). 
 52.  When a wife gives up work opportunities to concentrate on her home, husband, and 
children, her choice is likely a joint decision from which both spouses benefit in personal and 
economic ways, and the wife is seen as having built an entitlement to be compensated if the marriage 
ends.  John Eekelaar, Post-Divorce Financial Obligations, in CROSS CURRENTS: FAMILY LAW IN ENGLAND 
AND THE UNITED STATES SINCE WORLD WAR II, 405, 420, (Sanford N. Katz, John Eekelaar & Mavis 
Maclean eds., 2000). 
 53.  See, e.g., LaRoque, 406 N.W.2d.at 742. 
 54.  Blumberg, supra note 26, at 392. 
 55.  See Garrison, supra note 27; McMullen & Oswald, supra note 43. 
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accompanied by diminishing social sympathy for women who seek post-divorce 
spousal support.56  Although there is some evidence of popular support for 
utilizing alimony to help women stay home with young children, there is a 
remarkable lack of sympathy for divorcing women who have done just that and 
now find themselves divorced, jobless, and with an empty nest.57  In a recent 
study examining social attitudes towards awarding alimony after a divorce, 
Professors Ira Mark Ellman and Sanford Braver presented individuals with a 
survey, asking them to indicate whether they would award alimony to couples 
described in a series of vignettes and, if they would award it, how much they 
would award and for how long.58  This study illustrates the somewhat 
complicated relationship between alimony and child-rearing, showing that while 
the presence of minor children in a marriage significantly increases the likelihood 
that ordinary citizens would grant alimony to a parent who has primary 
responsibility for their care, the same citizens were not as sympathetic to a 
mother who had formerly been the primary caregiver.59  The data demonstrates 
“that our respondents are in general more likely to award alimony as the male 
partner’s income goes up, the female partner’s income goes down, the relational 
duration is extended, and when children are in the household.”60  Of these 
factors, only the disparity in the partners’ incomes has any significant effect on 
the amount.61  On the other hand, the survey respondents were less likely to 
award alimony if the children were grown (48 percent), rather than still in the 
household (58 percent), even if they were told that the mother previously had 
primary child-rearing responsibility.62  The respondents “seemed to care less 
about compensating the mother for the lingering costs that arose from her history 
of care, and more about the custodial household’s current situation.”63 
In Ellman and Braver’s study, respondents were sympathetic to stay-at-
home mothers and, to some extent, receptive to the notion that stay-at-home 
mothers might need continued financial support.64  However, respondents were 
less sympathetic to the women who are in many ways the most disadvantaged in 
the job market: the long-term stay-at-home mothers whose children have grown 
and left home.65  This data is consistent with Marsha Garrison’s findings that 
many displaced homemakers exiting long-term marriages do not receive alimony 
at the time of divorce.66  Moreover, the Ellman and Braver study emphasizes the 
lack of broad social support for women who have chosen to forgo significant 
 
 56.  See, e.g., Ira Mark Ellman & Sanford L. Braver, Lay Intuitions About Family Obligations: The 
Case of Alimony, (July 8, 2011) (unpublished working paper) (on file with the Social Science Research 
Network). 
 57.  Id. 
 58.  Id. 
 59.  Id. 
 60.  Id. 
 61.  Id.  The authors did not discuss the duration of the awards in this draft. 
 62.  Id. 
 63.  Id. 
 64.  Id. 
 65.  Id. 
 66.  See Garrison, supra note 27. 
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paid employment during their marriages.67 
In an online discussion about a stay-at-home divorced mother, several 
comments offer a clue as to the apparent lack of sympathy for women who seek 
post-divorce spousal support: namely the commenters’ own bad experiences.68  
Some of these people recount the divorces of their own parents as cautionary 
tales.69  One commenter describes her mother as having been in “an awful 
situation” after her husband of twenty-seven years divorced her.70  Her mother 
had no job skills or recent job experience, having stayed home to raise the 
children, but since the children were grown at the time of the divorce, the ex-
husband had no incentive to continue supporting his ex-wife.71  Another 
commenter, whose parents’ twenty-five year marriage ended unexpectedly with 
a “traumatic divorce,” opines that young people thinking about having a family 
should focus on job skills and “should only have as many children as would be 
feasible to support as a working parent.”72 
Other commenters cite their own divorce experiences.73  For example, one 
mother whose husband left her and their infant child was grateful she had the 
foresight to engage in part-time employment after the baby was born since she 
was in a position to become self-supporting after her husband’s unexpected 
departure and failure to continue child support payments.74  In a country with a 
50 percent divorce rate,75 it stands to reason that many individuals judge 
petitions for alimony in the light of their own experiences.  Many of these 
comments seem to demonstrate a belief that alimony is uncertain and that 
women should not count on it, especially since women may not be able even to 
count on steady, complete child-support payments from their ex-spouses. 
The biggest problem with alimony laws and practices may indeed be the 
sheer unpredictability of the outcomes in divorce cases where alimony is at issue.  
In Professor Garrison’s 1991 article, she examines data from 1978 and 1984, 
comparing alimony outcomes in light of factors such as wife’s age, length of 
marriage, wife’s contribution to family income, custody, type of legal 
representation, and husband’s income.76  Garrison concludes that, while there 
were some factors that were predictors of alimony awards, these factors did not 
completely explain alimony outcomes: 
An older, long-married wife whose income is low in relation to that of her 
husband is the best candidate for alimony, but many wives with all of these 
 
 67.  Ellman & Braver, supra note 56. 
 68.  Lisa Belkin, Divorce and the Stay-at-Home-Mom, N.Y.TIMES MOTHERLODE (Jan. 19, 2011, 12:48 
PM), http://parenting.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/01/19/divorce-and-the-stay-at-home-mom. 
 69.  See, e.g., Mary, Comment to Belkin, supra note 68; Icabod, Comment to Belkin, supra note 68; 
J.T., Comment to Belkin, supra note 68. 
 70.  Mary, Comment to Belkin, supra note 68. 
 71.  Belkin, supra note 68. 
 72.  J.T., Comment to Belkin, supra note 68. 
 73.  See, e.g., Opalmom, Comment to Belkin, supra note 68; lassie, Comment to Belkin, supra note 
68. 
 74.  lassie, Comment to Belkin, supra note 68. 
 75.  See National Marriage and Divorce Rate Trends, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION 
(MAR. 7, 2011), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nvss/marriage_divorce_tables.htm. 
 76.  Garrison, supra note 27, at 647. 
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characteristics still fail to obtain an alimony award.  A permanent award is, 
again, more likely in a long marriage, but is by no means guaranteed.  Moreover, 
the likelihood of an award is strongly correlated with the type of divorce action 
and the couple’s representation by legal counsel, factors that may bear no 
relationship to the appropriateness of an alimony award.  Alimony decision 
making appears to be partly rational, but to rest as well on factors that are 
inexplicable from the information at hand.77 
Garrison’s conclusions are based on her study of New York cases, but 
inconsistency is by no means limited to New York.78  The McMullen-Oswald 
study found that alimony awards were more likely if spouses were older, 
marriages were longer, and husbands had higher incomes, and that income 
disparity between the two spouses was significantly greater in cases where 
alimony was awarded.79  Nonetheless, just as in Garrison’s study, many people 
who could have received alimony based on the above factors (and arguably 
should have received alimony based on need) did not in fact receive it.80 
Moreover, unlike the states in which these studies were conducted, some 
states do not even have specific statutory standards setting forth how a court 
should determine whether to award alimony.81  Even in states that have specific 
factors a court must consider in deciding whether to award alimony, these 
factors are not typically ranked in terms of importance, which results in a 
confusing and unpredictable system where courts make ad hoc decisions, and 
neither lawyers nor divorcing parties can predict what will happen.82  While 
some jurisdictions now use formulas for alimony, such formulas are typically 
aimed at calculating alimony awards rather than specifying who is eligible to 
receive alimony.83  This uncertainty may disadvantage either party, but it likely 
is more of a hindrance to women since women are more likely to have a lower 
income and spend greater time away from the workforce, especially if there are 
children from the marriage.84 
Alimony has not traditionally been guided by the kind of coherent theories 
that govern other issues in divorce.85  In the case of property division, most states 
have moved towards an equal division of property accumulated during the 
 
 77.  Id. at 711. 
 78.  See McMullen & Oswald, supra note 43, at 76–77. 
 79.  Id. 
 80.  Id. 
 81.  Jennifer L. McCoy, Comment, Spousal Support Disorder: An Overview of Problems in Current 
Alimony Law, 33 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 501, 502 (2005); David A. Hardy, Nevada Alimony: An Important 
Policy in Need of a Coherent Policy Purpose, 9 NEV. L.J. 325, 325–26 (2009).  For example, Michigan 
authorizes grants of alimony as satisfaction of all of the wife’s dower or other claims in the property 
of the husband, but does not list factors to be considered in determining when the award of alimony 
is proper.  MICH. COMP. LAWS § 552.101 (2011).  Another section allows a court to order payments for 
the support of custodial parents of minor children, where the parent cannot provide necessities for 
herself or her children, and the other parent has the ability to pay.  MICH. COMP. LAWS § 552.451 
(2011).  The statute lists no criteria that must be considered by the court in making or denying the 
award other than need (of the recipient) and ability to pay (of the non-custodial parent). 
 82.  Hardy, supra note 81, at 336. 
 83.  See infra Part IV.C. 
 84.  See infra Part II.B. 
 85.  AREEN & REGAN, FAMILY LAW 696 (5th ed. 2006). 
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marriage as a presumptive starting point.86  Child support is determined by 
formulas, and deviations are allowed in only extremely high or low-income 
situations.87  Even custody, with its long history of rhetoric insisting on child-
centered case-by-case determinations, is increasingly addressed from a 
presumption of significant physical placement time with each parent.88  Alimony, 
though, remains purely discretionary with the court, and the lack of coherent 
standards guiding the decision makes it completely unpredictable. 
B. Social Changes in Marriage and Divorce: The Traditional Explanation for 
Alimony’s Decline 
This section re-examines a traditional line of analysis which holds that social 
trends in divorce and marriage have combined to produce the patterns of decline 
and inconsistency that we currently see in alimony awards.  This analysis focuses 
on two trends: first, that men and women alike have come to seek marriage less 
for its possible economic benefits and more for its provision of love and 
emotional fulfillment, and second, that the sharing of both earning and parenting 
roles by ever-growing numbers of spouses has changed social expectations about 
what is fair in the event of a divorce.89  The conclusion is that these developments 
have likely contributed to a general reluctance to claim, agree to, or award 
alimony. 
There have certainly been profound changes over the past century in the 
way people view marriage in general and equally profound changes in the way 
they view goals and responsibilities within their own marriages.  It appears that 
marriage has come to be viewed less as an economically beneficial arrangement 
and more as an emotionally satisfying relationship.90  In the nineteenth century, 
marriage allowed a gender-based division of labor and entitled a man to the 
labor of his wife and of his children.91  Marriage was also how nineteenth century 
women achieved economic security.92 
As the twentieth century unfolded, marriage increasingly became viewed as 
a source of love, happiness, and emotional fulfillment.93  Sociologist Andrew J. 
Cherlin maintains that by the early twentieth century, law and tradition gave 
way to companionate marriage, which is based on the love and friendship of a 
wife and a husband.94  Cherlin also describes a second transition for marriage, 
beginning around 1960, when marriage evolved from “companionate marriage” 
 
 86.  HARRIS, TEITELBAUM & CARBONE, supra note 31, at 398–400. 
 87.  Id. at 504–11. 
 88.  Id. at 643–44. 
 89.  See, e.g., Andrew J. Cherlin, American Marriage in the Early Twenty-First Century, 15 
MARRIAGE & CHILD WELLBEING 33 (2005). 
 90.  See id. 
 91.  Interview with Hendrik Hartog, Professor of History, PRINCETON UNIV., DEPT. OF HISTORY (last 
updated Aug. 17, 2011), available at http://www.princeton.edu/history/people/ 
display_person.xml?netid=hartog&interview=yes. 
 92.  Id. 
 93.  Cherlin, supra note 89, at 39. 
 94.  Id. 
McMullen_Paginated (Do Not Delete) 3/13/2012  10:14 AM 
52 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY Volume 19:41 2011 
to what he calls “individualized” marriage.95  Individualized marriages include 
families where both spouses were wage-earners and where gender roles within 
the family were negotiated between the partners.96  Marital satisfaction came to 
be evaluated by people in terms of their own sense of self rather than their sense 
of satisfaction about being a competent parent or good spouse.97  Cherlin notes 
that while there are still marriages that fit the companionate model, the survival 
of companionate marriage is more a reflection of the range of choices modern 
spouses have in developing their own roles within their marriage rather than 
merely stepping into roles dictated by society.98  “The rewards that people seek 
through marriage and other close relationships have also shifted.  Individuals 
aim for personal growth and deeper intimacy through more open 
communication and mutually shared disclosures about feelings with their 
partners.  They may insist upon changes in a relationship that no longer provides 
them with individualized rewards.”99 
Research about marriage over the past few decades has consistently 
concluded that fewer people now view marriage primarily as an arrangement 
offering economic security, and more people see marriage as providing 
companionship and its accompanying emotional benefits.100  For example, in a 
2001 national survey, a large majority of young women expressed a preference 
for a husband who can communicate his feelings over a husband who earns a 
good income.101  It appears that college graduates are even less likely than non-
college graduates to see economic security as the main benefit of marriage.102  
“For centuries, marriage was viewed as an economic and social institution, and 
the emotional and intellectual needs of the spouses were secondary to the 
survival of the marriage itself.  But in modern relationships, people are looking 
for a partnership, and they want partners who make their lives more 
 
 95.   Id. at 40–41. 
 96.   Id. 
 97.   Id. at 41. 
 98.   Id. 
 99.  Id. 
 100.  See, e.g., id. at 40–41; Milton C. Regan, Jr., Spouses and Strangers: Divorce Obligations and 
Property Rhetoric, 82 GEO. L.J. 2303, 2306 (1994).  Some scholars, however, believe that the notion of an 
equal partnership is more rhetoric than practice.  See, e.g., Alicia Brokars Kelly, The Marital Partnership 
Pretense and Career Assets: The Ascendency of Self Over the Marriage Community, 81 B.U. L. REV. 59, 61 
(2001) (arguing that despite the widely espoused notion of marriage as a partnership, the earning 
spouse’s individual claim to property and income tends to win out when the marriage ends in 
divorce). 
 101. Andrew J. Cherlin, Public Display, WASH. POST, Sept. 7, 2003, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/09/05/AR2008090502652.html.  
In the survey, which was conducted by the National Marriage Project, more than 80 percent of 
women in their twenties agreed with the statement that it’s more important “to have a husband who 
can communicate about his deepest feelings than to have a husband who makes a good living.”  Id. 
 102.  “Among non-college graduates—both male and female—around 20 percent agree that 
‘financial security is the main benefit of marriage’; while only 6 percent of college graduates thought 
this.”  BETSEY STEVENSON & ADAM ISEN, COUNCIL ON CONTEMP. FAMILIES, WHO’S GETTING MARRIED? 
EDUCATION AND MARRIAGE TODAY AND IN THE PAST (2010), available at 
http://www.contemporaryfamilies.org/images/stories/homepage/orange_border/ccf012510.pdf 
(reporting result of the General Social Survey). 
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interesting.”103  Couples are now looking for relationships that are satisfying and 
self-enriching.104 
At the same time that people increasingly see marriage as a possible source 
of happiness, marriage is no longer viewed as a necessary precursor to happiness 
or success in life.105  Surveys reveal that “fewer people now agree with the 
statement that married people are happier than unmarried people.”106  One 
possible conclusion that can be drawn from these studies is that, where couples 
marry primarily for happiness rather than for economic security, they are less 
likely to expect economic security to continue (if it ever existed) after a divorce. 
Just as reasons for marriage have evolved, there have been changes in 
attitudes, expectations, and practices surrounding married women engaging in 
paid employment.  Alimony developed in response to a model in which wives 
were economically dependent on husbands who likely earned all of the income 
and held title to all of the property.107  Women have long contributed to the 
economic well-being of their families by producing household goods and by 
working side-by-side with their husbands on family farms and in family 
businesses, but divorce could leave a woman destitute in a world where women 
had little access to outside employment and a living wage.108  Until the twentieth 
century, few married women worked for pay outside the home.109  In 1890, only 
4.5 percent of married women held paying jobs in the economy.110  By 1980, 50 
percent of married women who were living with their husbands were either 
engaged in or seeking paid employment.111  The trend was particularly marked 
among married women with young children: between 1950 and 1980, the 
 
 103.  Tara Parker-Pope, Op-Ed., The Happy Marriage is the “Me” Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 
2010, at WK4, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/02/weekinreview/ 
02parkerpope.html?_r=1&scp=2&sq=tara%20parker-pope&st=cse. 
 104.  Id. 
 105.  Cherlin, supra note 89, at 40–41. 
 106.  STEVENSON & ISEN, supra note 102.  “However, there is one exception: college-educated 
women.  This trend reflects their marital behavior: in 1988, female college graduates were the least 
likely to agree that married people are happier and, by 2002, they were the most likely to agree.  A 
similar pattern has not occurred among men, rather both those with and without college degrees 
became less likely to agree over time.”  Id.  Stevenson and Isen also found that people with higher 
levels of education tend to be happier in their own marriages, and tend to think that other married 
people are also happier than are unmarried people.  These higher levels of marital happiness are 
higher among college-educated people, and do not become significantly less even if other related 
factors—such as employment of wives, household income or number of children—vary.  Id. 
 107.  See discussion supra Part II.A. 
 108.  For example, under a purely title-based system of property distribution at divorce, 
ownership would remain with the spouse in whose name the property was held, usually the 
husband, and a court would have little discretion to award property to the wife, even if she had 
worked to develop and preserve the property.  No common law state currently uses this system.  
HARRIS, TEITELBAUM & CARBONE, supra note 31, at 398. 
 109.  See generally AMERICA’S WORKING WOMEN: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, 1600 TO THE PRESENT 
(Rosalyn Baxandall & Linda Gordon eds., 2nd ed. 1995). 
 110.  LINDA J. WAITE, POPULATION REFERENCE BUREAU & RAND CORP., U.S. WOMEN AT WORK 1–2 
(1981), available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/2008/R2824.pdf. 
 111.  Id. at 3.  These married female workers “made up 56 percent of the female labor force, with a 
quarter more still unmarried and the remaining 19 percent divorced, separated, or widowed 
women.”  Id. 
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percentage of married women with children under age six in the labor force went 
from 12 percent to 45 percent.112  By 2008, 64 percent of married mothers with 
children under age six held jobs outside the home.113  There is no doubt that 
working wives provide their families with greater economic security and 
financial flexibility, and dual incomes provide the means to achieve a higher 
standard of living and a hedge against the possible lay off of one spouse.114  
Workforce participation by married women, even married women with young 
children, is widely viewed positively as one way in which women can contribute 
to the well-being of their families as well as to their own financial security.115 
The movement of women into the workforce has changed not only the 
employment prospects of the women themselves but also the economic 
relationship between many women and their partners.116  Since the 1970s, 
women have, on average, made greater gains in education and employment than 
men; women’s earnings have increased faster than men’s earnings, and men 
were far more likely to have lost their jobs in the current economic downturn.117 
Many wives are more educated or earn more money than their husbands.  
Between 1970 and 2007, the percentage of husbands with more education than 
their wives declined from 28 percent to 19 percent.118  Over that same time 
period, the percentage of husbands who had wives with a higher income rose 
from 4 percent to 22 percent.119  By 2009, 63 percent of mothers contributed at 
least a quarter of their families’ incomes.120  College-educated women are more 
likely to marry than ever before, and while they are less likely to divorce, if they 
do divorce, they are in theory in better positions to become adequately self-
supporting.121 
The alimony situation in this country is affected by the large number of 
married mothers engaged in paid employment.  The increasing levels of 
educated women with job skills raise expectations that women can become self-
supporting after a divorce.122  Similarly, the fact that so many mothers engage in 
paid employment during marriage raises expectations that virtually any mother 
 
 112.  Id. 
 113.  HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, FAILING ITS FAMILIES: LACK OF PAID LEAVE AND WORK-FAMILY 
SUPPORTS IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (2011), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/ 
reports/us0211webwcover.pdf. 
 114.  WAITE, supra note 110, at 3–4. 
 115.  See generally SUSAN CHIRA, A MOTHER’S PLACE: CHOOSING WORK AND FAMILY WITHOUT 
GUILT OR BLAME (1998). 
 116.  See, e.g., OKIN, supra note 51, at 157–58 (claiming that women’s relative power in a marriage 
varies according to her level of economic contributions to the family). 
 117.  Sam Roberts, More Men Marrying Wealthier Women, N.Y. TIMES , Jan. 19, 2010, at A18, available 
at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/19/us/19marriage.html (reporting analysis of census data by 
the Pew Research Center, which showed that in “the latest recession, . . . men held about three in four 
of the jobs that were lost,” and that “women’s earnings have been increasing faster than men’s since 
the 1970s”). 
 118.  Id. 
 119.  Id. 
 120.  HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 113, at 13. 
 121.  See STEVENSON, supra note 102. 
 122.  See OKIN, supra note 51, at 163–64. 
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could become self-supporting if she were sufficiently motivated.123  Issues of 
work-family balance present couples with the opportunity to make individual 
decisions about whether the mother should remain in the paid workforce or stay 
at home with the children during the marriage, but in the event of a divorce, it 
becomes difficult to argue that it was necessary the wife stay at home when so 
many other families made a different choice.  If her staying at home was not 
necessary or coerced by the husband, it becomes more difficult to argue that the 
wife should be either compensated for staying at home or paid so that she can 
continue to stay at home in the future. 
In addition, in many states divorce laws have evolved over the past several 
decades to favor joint custody of minor children.124  Although couples can opt for 
sole custody in one parent and courts can order primary physical custody in one 
parent after considering a variety of factors, the clear public policy in most states 
is to maximize, whenever possible, the placement time that minor children spend 
with their mothers and their fathers.125  When there is no presumption in favor of 
a mother receiving custody (and there may even be a presumption against it), 
many of the traditional rationales for significant or long-term alimony melt 
away.126  If both parents are expected to share post-divorce childcare, both 
parents can also be expected to obtain paid employment for the support of 
themselves and their children, even if they were not employed during the 
marriage.127  In that situation, it will not be necessary to subsidize one parent’s 
decision to stay home “for the sake of the children,” and alimony—if any is 
awarded—will be geared towards rehabilitating the income capacity of one of 
the spouses as rapidly as possible. 
Even more problematic is alimony for a stay-at-home mother whose 
children are grown.  If she has remained at home or reduced her paid 
employment throughout her children’s years at home, she may have spent many 
years out of the workforce and is much older than competing jobseekers as she 
looks to re-enter the job market.128  Yet, except for supporting a brief period of 
rehabilitation, it becomes harder for many people to embrace the idea of 
 
 123.  Id. 
 124.  See, e.g., California. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3040 (West 2004). 
 125.  See, e.g., WIS. STAT § 767.41(2) (2011) (establishing that joint legal custody is presumed); id. at 
§ 767.41(4) (noting that the court “shall set a placement schedule that allows the child to have 
regularly occurring meaningful periods of placement” and “maximizes the amount of time the child 
may spend with each parent”). 
 126.  Historically, alimony has been used to protect women who have specialized in domestic 
labor from economic devastation in the event of divorce or abandonment.  GARY S. BECKER, A 
TREATISE ON THE FAMILY 44 (1991).  Women with children are most likely to decide to remain home 
from work to care for their families when the children are small, and they will often try to re-enter the 
workforce when the children are in school or grown.  See generally, LESLIE BENNETTS, THE FEMININE 
MISTAKE (2007).  If the children are absent from a woman’s household not because they are grown or 
in school, but because they are at their father’s home for a significant period of time, the mother can 
no longer use childcare to justify remaining out of the workforce. 
 127.  The disproportionate amount of time and energy that women spend in child care is likely 
the reason that many of those women earn less than men.  BECKER, supra note 126, at 56.  If men and 
women have equal post-divorce childcare responsibilities, it follows that they could be expected to 
have equal amounts of time and energy left to invest in paid employment. 
 128.  See, e.g., BENNETTS, supra note 126. 
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requiring the payment of alimony to a woman they might see as someone who 
made a risky choice that ended badly.129 
Of course, the theoretical ability to obtain paid employment is not 
necessarily the ability to immediately earn an income that allows self-support at 
a standard of living at or near the marital standard of living, even if the spouses 
had reasonably equal income potentials at the beginning of the marriage.130  
There is a significant wage gap between men and women in the United States; 
census figures show that women earn only seventy-seven cents for every dollar 
earned by men.131  Although one explanation for this discrepancy is 
discrimination, a large part of the difference might be due to the lower income 
potential of many female-dominated jobs, such as teaching or nursing, as well as 
the fact that female workers work fewer hours on average than do male 
workers.132  However, Census Bureau figures show that women are paid less on 
average than men for the same occupations, including male-dominated 
occupations that presumably pay higher salaries.133 
If wage differences are due to gender discrimination, or even individual 
preferences for lower paid professions, it may seem unfair to burden an ex-
husband with alimony to even the score.  Yet the lower average number of hours 
worked by women, as well as the choice of professions that tend to have more 
family-friendly hours, are decisions women often make for the benefit of their 
families.134  A significant number of women reduce their hours or leave paid 
employment in order to stay home with their children, and husband and wife 
may both view this decision as economically rational.135 
No matter what a woman’s income potential at the beginning of her 
marriage, the decision to leave the paid workforce in favor of staying at home 
with the children is economically risky.136  Women who leave paid employment 
for even relatively brief periods of time during their marriages may suffer career-
long monetary consequences; even a three-year hiatus may reduce a woman’s 
income by one-third.137  Moreover, women who have become stay-at-home 
 
 129.  See Ellman & Braver, supra note 56 (showing that survey respondents were less likely to 
award alimony if the children were grown rather than if they were still in the home). 
 130.  See, e.g., BENNETTS, supra note 126, chs. 4–6 (arguing that women suffer severe and 
permanent losses in income from leaving the paid workforce and run the risk of not being able to 
enter the workforce except at a low income wage level). 
 131.  Laura Fitzpatrick, Why Do Women Still Earn Less Than Men?, TIME, Apr. 20, 2010, available at  
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1983185,00.html. 
 132.  Carrie Lukas, Op-Ed., There is no Male-Female Wage Gap, WALL ST. J., Apr. 12, 2011, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704415104576250672504707048.html (citing 
Department of Labor statistics that full-time working women spend an average of 8.01 hours per day 
on the job, compared to the 8.75 hours spent by men). 
 133.  Fitzpatrick, supra note 131 (stating that female secretaries earn 83.4 percent as much as male 
secretaries, and female truck drivers earn 76.5 percent as much as male truck drivers). 
 134.  See discussion infra Part III.A.ii. 
 135.  Id. 
 136.  See generally BENNETTS, supra note 126.  See also Hekker, supra note 16 (detailing her post-
divorce lack of job skills and income, and the subsequent fall in her standard of living). 
 137. See BENNETTS, supra note 126, at 86–108 (describing the difficulty of rejoining the workforce 
after having opted out).  Bennetts quotes Sylvia Hewlett, who claims that women lose 37 percent of 
their earning power when they leave the workforce for three or more years.  Id. at 93. 
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mothers for any significant time face significant barriers to re-entering the 
workforce.138  One 2005 Center for Work-Life Policy study found that only 40 
percent of stay-at-home mothers who want to return to full-time work find full-
time positions; another 34 percent settle for part-time employment.139  These 
results do not meet the above-described expectation that a divorced woman can 
quickly become self-supporting at a reasonable standard of living without 
alimony.  Nonetheless, alimony remains scarce.140 
III. INSIGHTS FROM SOCIAL SCIENCE: THE ROLE OF GUILT AND SHAME 
While the family law system has become more uniform and formula-driven 
over time, alimony has remained an unpredictable outlier.  It may be the case 
that the vague, subjective standards, and their seemingly free-wheeling 
application, reflect the ambivalence of society in general, or family court judges 
and divorcing couples in particular, toward the notion of a continuing stream of 
financial support from one ex-spouse to another.  Indeed, analyzing alimony 
awards—or the lack thereof—is complicated by the fact that both parties and the 
judge are involved in the decision-making process.141  If neither party seeks 
alimony, or if a party seeking alimony enters a settlement agreement that waives 
it, no alimony will be awarded.142  If the parties disagree about alimony, the 
judge’s decision will likely be based on a combination of the application of vague 
guidelines and deeply held personal values.143 
The low percentage of divorce cases in which alimony is ordered does not 
only result from courts failing to award alimony, for the vast majority of divorce 
cases are settled between the parties or resolved by default.144  Estimates of how 
many divorces settle out of court vary from state to state, but all estimates reflect 
the fact that the vast majority of cases are settled rather than litigated.145  Thus, 
 
 138.  See, e.g., Katherine Reynolds Lewis, Op-Ed., The Return: A Stay-at-home Mom Attempts to Go 
Back to Work After Nearly Two Decades.  Can She Revive Her Career?, WASH. POST, Apr. 4, 2010, available 
at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/03/29/AR2010032902620.html 
(chronicling the long, frustrating, but ultimately successful job hunt of a middle-aged woman who 
has not worked as a lawyer for seventeen years). 
 139.  Id. 
 140.  See discussion supra Part II.A. 
 141.  Although parties may enter into agreements concerning maintenance either before or during 
the marriage, such agreements are only one of many factors that the court must consider when 
deciding whether to award maintenance.  See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 767.56 (2011). 
 142.  Alimony may be requested—or not—in a divorce petition or response and is a box to be 
checked on many court-supplied forms.  Although a court may consider factors such as need and 
fairness, alimony can be waived by either party.  See, e.g., Steinmann v. Steinmann, 749 N.W.2d 145 
(Wis. 2008). 
 143.  See Ira Mark Ellman, The Maturing Law of Divorce Finances: Toward Rules and Guidelines, 33 
FAM. L.Q. 801, 809 (1999).  Alimony statutes “said no more than that a judge might award it to a 
spouse ‘in need,’ but need was in concept and in practice enormously elastic . . . .  The absence of any 
consensus on the policy rationale for alimony meant that the alimony claimant was effectively 
dependent upon the charitable inclinations of the trial judge.”  Id. 
 144.  See, e.g., Penelope Bryan, Women’s Freedom to Contract at Divorce: A Mask for Contextual 
Coercion, 47 BUFF. L. REV.47 1153, 1155–56 (1999) (stating that 90–95 percent of divorce cases are 
resolved by default or settlement). 
 145.  See id. 
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the paucity of alimony means that in many cases women are waiving it: either 
the women do not request alimony to begin with, or they bargain it away during 
their settlement negotiations.  It may be that lawyers prefer to settle cases and 
may pressure their clients to accept settlements, even unfavorable ones.146 
The demise of alimony might in some way be related to the fact that 
recipients are overwhelmingly female, despite the fact that the award of alimony 
is—in theory—gender neutral.  Not only social trends but also individual 
feelings of guilt or shame may lead women to avoid aggressive pursuit of 
alimony awards because women believe they are undeserving of the awards or 
are unlikely to obtain them.  These guilty and shameful feelings may exacerbate 
the disadvantages many women already face when engaging in divorce 
mediation or negotiation.147  Meanwhile, social influences that tend to reduce 
guilt and shame experienced by divorcing men may make many men adamant 
about not paying alimony, and many judges loath to award alimony in contested 
cases.148  Belief in gender equality in the workplace, internalized by men and 
women alike, has perhaps further eroded the already infrequent award of 
alimony for any significant period of time.149 
A. Women, Marriage, Divorce, and Guilt 
Many women who are technically eligible for alimony decline to 
aggressively pursue it.  This section argues that these divorcing women feel guilt 
and shame about their divorces and the financial circumstances in which they 
find themselves at the time of divorce.  This guilt comes partly from evolving 
societal expectations about marriage, parenthood, and divorce, and partly from 
individual emotional tendencies to accept blame for the end of the marriage.150  
For one thing, there is evidence that women are socially programmed to feel 
responsible for the success or failure of family relationships.151  In addition, social 
pressure to be a perfect mother may lead many women to make risky economic 
decisions and leave or reduce paid employment to focus on mothering.152  Later, 
if this turns out badly, these women may feel guilty or ashamed of having acted 
imprudently.  Additionally, the spouse who initiates the divorce process more 
acutely experiences guilt, and women are more likely to be the divorce 
initiators.153  Finally, there is some evidence that women may not negotiate as 
effectively as men in situations where alimony is at issue.154  If women feel 
undeserving of alimony, they may fail to pursue it, or they may be easily 
persuaded by lawyers or judges to settle even if the settlement means that no 
alimony will be paid.155 
 
 146.  Id. at 1234–35. 
 147.  See discussion infra Part III.A.iv. 
 148.  See discussion infra Part III.B. 
 149.  See generally MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY 175–80 (1991). 
 150.  See discussion infra, Part III.A.i.–iii.. 
 151.  See discussion infra Part III.A.i. 
 152.  See discussion infra Part III.A.ii. 
 153.  See discussion infra Part III.A.iii. 
 154.  See discussion infra, Part III.A.iv. 
 155.  Id. 
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The words “guilt” and “shame” are used more or less interchangeably in 
ordinary conversation, but in fact they are somewhat different.156  The Oxford 
English Dictionary defines “guilt” as “a failure of duty, delinquency; offence, 
crime, sin.”157  To feel guilty is to feel a sense of responsibility for some act, but 
the mere feeling of guilt does not settle the question of whether the act was, in 
fact, wrongful.158  The dictionary definition of “shame,” in contrast, is “[t]he 
painful emotion arising from the consciousness of something dishonouring, 
ridiculous, or indecorous in one’s own conduct or circumstances (or in those of 
others whose honour or disgrace one regards as one’s own), or of being in a 
situation which offends one’s sense of modesty or decency. “159  To feel shame is 
to feel like a failure.160 
Scholars and clinicians who deal with emotion make similar distinctions, 
defining “guilt” as an emotion that is rooted in the conscious acknowledgement 
of wrongdoing and is driven by a desire for positive interpersonal relationships 
marked by attachment and empathy:161 “[g]uilt is a type of self-punishing anger, 
reacting to the perception that one has done a wrong or harm.”162  Shame, on the 
other hand, is not act-specific: it pervades the entire self, and is a painful 
experience of the perceived failure of the self to attain some ideal condition.163  
“In shame, one feels inadequate, lacking some kind of desired type of 
completeness or perfection.”164  To put it simply, “guilt comes from failing to 
meet your own standards, shame from failing to meet other people’s 
standards.”165  In the context of divorce and alimony, this article defines “guilt” 
as a painful feeling of failure that results from acting in a way that led to a 
divorce or problematic emotional or financial circumstances at the end of a 
marriage.  This article defines “shame” as a painful feeling of inadequacy and 
self-loathing for having failed to attain society’s vision of the perfect spouse, 
perfect parent, or perfect marriage. 
 
 156.  See OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989). 
 157.  Id. at 935. 
 158.  A person feels guilt when her behavior does not match her personal values.  Nehami Baum, 
“Separation Guilt” in Women Who Initiate Divorce, 35 CLIN. SOC. WORK. J. 47, 49 (2006).  However, 
people may internalize idiosyncratic values not shared by the larger society and thus feel guilty about 
things that are not considered wrongful by others.  For example, a woman might feel guilty about 
staying up late to watch a movie on television, but in itself (and perhaps even in her particular 
circumstances) her action may not be wrongful in any meaningful way. 
 159.  OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 156, at 162. 
 160.  Jessica Benetti-McQuoid & Krisanne Bursik, Individual Differences in Experiences of and 
Responses to Guilt and Shame: Examining the Lenses of Gender and Gender Role, 53 SEX ROLES 133, 134 
(2005). 
 161.  “Today, most researchers and clinicians define guilt as an interpersonally driven emotion, 
stemming from altruism and fear of harming others.  They regard it as rooted in empathy and based 
on the need to maintain attachments to others . . . In addition, without rejecting this view, some 
writers emphasize the cognitive element of guilt.  They locate the roots of guilt in the cognitive 
perception of wrongdoing, and identify its affective components as remorse and emotional tension 
resulting from the incongruence between the person’s behavior and his or her internalized values.” 
Baum, supra note 158, at 49. 
 162.  MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY 207 (2004). 
 163.  Id. at 184. 
 164.  Id.  See also Benetti-McQuoid & Bursik, supra note 160, at 134. 
 165.  Suanne Kelman, What is it About Women & Guilt?, 66 CHATELAINE 55, 55 (1993). 
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The concepts of guilt and shame remain somewhat overlapping because one 
can trigger the other.166  For example, a husband may feel guilty for having 
broken his marriage vows by having an affair, and he may try to reignite his love 
for his wife.  If his efforts are not successful, he may feel ashamed of being a 
husband who has failed to remain loyal and loving and who has been dishonest 
in his marriage.  His feeling of shame may make him feel bad enough that he acts 
in a cold or angry way towards his wife, and he may then feel guilty over his 
harsh or insensitive actions.  Moreover, guilt and shame may be experienced 
simultaneously in response to certain situations.  The unfaithful husband in the 
above example may feel guilt over the act of having an affair or speaking harshly 
to his wife, and he may feel shame for being an unfaithful or nasty spouse. 
i. Women and Emotional Vulnerability 
Guilt is a natural part of the divorce process, just as guilt is a natural part of 
many experiences involving loss or separation.167  Both men and women may 
experience guilt over acts prior to, during, or after the divorce process.  There is 
reason to believe, however, that women are especially affected by guilt and 
shame.  In the first place, women may be socially programmed to accept 
responsibility for facilitating family relationships and to accept blame—and feel 
guilty—when there is a breakdown in those relationships because women are 
traditionally conditioned to grow into the caretakers of other family members.168  
Research on male-female gender roles concludes that men tend “to adopt more 
assertive, controlling and independent behaviors,” while women tend to “occupy 
communal roles leading to the development of caring, nurturing, sensitive 
behaviors, and concern with others’ welfare.”169  Although both men and women 
practice love and care of individuals, there are gender differences in how care 
work is defined for each gender.170  Since most societies assign assertive, 
dominant, and independent roles to men, men’s caring traditionally tends to be 
defined as breadwinning and attendance at significant family events, while 
women have been expected to perform the day-to-day tasks of caring.171  Thus, 
Professor Kathleen Lynch characterizes men as “care commanders” and women 
 
 166.  NUSSBAUM, supra note 162, at 207–08. 
 167.  Baum, supra note 158, at 48.  See also PAULINE H. TESLER & PEGGY THOMPSON, The Emotional 
Roller Coaster of Divorce in COLLABORATIVE DIVORCE: THE REVOLUTIONARY NEW WAY TO RESTRUCTURE 
YOUR FAMILY, RESOLVE LEGAL ISSUES, AND MOVE ON WITH YOUR LIFE 13, 13–39 (Pauline H. Tesler & 
Peggy Thompson eds., 2006), available at http://www.womansdivorce.com/emotional-stages-of-
divorce.html.  The guilt may be mixed with shame: one recently divorced woman wrote about feeling 
she was on “the ledge of personal and profound failure” on the day she got her divorce decree.  Lisa 
del Rosso, Op-Ed., Saying “I Don’t” to Release the Anger, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2011, at ST 5, 
www.nytimes.com/2011/01/23/fashion/23Modern.html?pagewanted-all. 
 168.  Kelman, supra note 165, at 55. 
 169.  Cynthia D. Mohr et al., Daily Interpersonal Experiences and Distress: Are Women More 
Vulnerable? 22 J. SOC. & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 393, 394 (2003) (citing Alice H. Eagly, Sex Differences in 
Social Behavior: Comparing Social Role Theory and Evolutionary Psychology, 1997 AM. PSYCHOL. 1380 
(1997)). 
 170.  Kathleen Lynch, Affective Equality: Who Cares?, 52 DEV. 410, 411 (2009). 
 171.  Id. at 411–12.  The way Lynch sees it, men fulfill society’s expectations if they support the 
family and show up for family events like weddings and funerals, whereas women fulfill society’s 
expectations by doing routine feeding, nursing, chauffeuring, etc.  Id. 
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as “care footsoldiers.”172 
Although individual women may agree to share caring responsibilities for 
their families with their husbands, some psychologists believe that women 
remain more prone to feel both a continued sense of responsibility for the family 
relationships and a feeling of guilt if there are difficulties in the relationships.173  
For example, Lynch characterizes care work as falling into two distinct 
categories, which she calls “love labouring” and “secondary care labouring.”174  
Lynch defines love labour as “the emotional and other work oriented to the 
enrichment and enablement of others, and the bond between self and others.”175  
She argues that it cannot be readily reassigned.176  Thus, time spent cuddling or 
playing with the children is less likely to be scheduled and more likely to be 
jealously guarded by a single parent.177  Lynch defines secondary care labouring 
as practical tasks that can be undertaken in the care of a family member, and she 
suggests that this kind of caring responsibility can be shared or reassigned in a 
contractual way.178  So, for example, mothers and fathers might agree that one 
will drive the school carpool in the morning while the other will drive in the 
afternoon.  Lynch then claims that women are morally impelled by social custom 
(and sometimes law) to do love labour for family members, and that women’s 
sense of self and individual worth is inextricably linked to this unequal care 
burden.179 
If Lynch’s theory is correct, the mere reallocation of household 
responsibilities seen in many modern Western marriages would not alleviate the 
feelings of guilt and shame associated with women failing to fulfill the caring 
(love labour) roles in the marriage and likely would not reduce the amount of 
love labour performed by women even if men agreed to share the burden.  
Indeed, there is evidence that this may be the case.180  Since the 1960s, men in the 
United States have, on average, doubled their contributions to housework and 
tripled the amount of time they spend caring for their children.181  Although the 
 
 172.  Id. at 411. 
 173.  Id. at 412–13. 
 174.  Id. at 413.  A similar concept, “emotional labor,” has been in the psychological literature for 
at least twenty-five years since the term was coined by Arlie Hochschild.  See Mary Ellen Guy & 
Meredith A. Newman, Women’s Jobs, Men’s Jobs: Sex Segregation and Emotional Labor, 64 PUB. ADMIN. 
REV. 289 (2001) (arguing that emotional labor is undervalued both at home and in paid workplaces, 
where its performance by women in female-dominated jobs leads to lower pay in those jobs). 
 175.  Lynch, supra note 170, at 413. 
 176.  Id. 
 177.  Id. 
 178.  Id. at 413.  Lynch claims that “only certain aspects of care could be handed over to others or 
paid for at times without undermining the relational identity of both carer and care recipient.” Id.  
She notes that while “secondary care labouring . . . can be commodified . . . love labouring work 
cannot be commodified without being fundamentally altered and rendered as something else.”  Id. 
 179.  “The fact that love labouring must be done and that women are the people assigned to do it, 
this means that women’s sense of self, their sense of being of worth as a woman is tied up with taking 
a very unequal burden of caring.”  Id. 
 180.  See, e.g., Robert Pear, Married and Single Parents Spending More Time With Children, Study 
Finds, N.Y.TIMES, Oct. 17, 2006, available at http://nytimes.com/2006/10/17/us/ 
17kids.html?pagewanted. 
 181.   See BGU Study Shows Women and Men Equally Share Housework, AM. ASSOCIATES BEN-GURION 
McMullen_Paginated (Do Not Delete) 3/13/2012  10:14 AM 
62 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY Volume 19:41 2011 
extra housework performed by men has somewhat lessened the burden on 
women (especially women who are employed outside the home), the effect of 
increased male participation in childcare is more complicated.182  Women—who 
already spent comparatively large amounts of time performing childcare 
duties—also increased the amount of time spent on childcare over the same 
period of time.183  This data supports Lynch’s suggestion that women find it 
extremely difficult to give up love labour, particularly in connection with their 
children.  Even in the face of increased childcare by fathers, mothers increased 
their childcare time.184  Perhaps both mothers and fathers were at least partly 
responding to social expectations linking good parenting with more time spent 
with children. 
Several studies confirm that women are somehow predisposed to have a 
greater sense of responsibility for the success of family relations and to 
experience more intense negative emotions (such as guilt and shame) when the 
relationships encounter difficulties.185  In one study, Spanish researchers placed 
subjects in conflict situations and discovered that men and women experienced 
different emotional reactions, and that women’s reactions tended to be more 
intense.186  Similarly, another study found that women were more emotionally 
aware than their male partners when faced with difficult or conflict situations 
specific to their relationship as a couple.187  Many researchers also agree that 
women are more likely to become upset by events that threaten their 
relationships.188  Other researchers conclude that women’s greater tendency to 
 
UNIV. OF THE NEGEV (Mar. 6, 2008), http://www.aabgu.org/media-center/news-releases/study-
shows-women-and-men-share-housework.html. 
 182.  See Pear, supra note 180; Oriel Sullivan & Scott Coltrane, Men’s Changing Contributions to 
Housework and Childcare, COUNCIL ON CONTEMPORARY FAMILIES (2008), 
http://www.contemporaryfamilies.org/marriage-partnership-divorce/menchange.html?q=coltrane 
(last visited Jan. 17, 2012). 
 183.  Id.  Research by Suzanne Bianchi claims that between 1965 and 2000, married mothers 
increased the average time spent on childcare from 10.6 hours per week to 12.9 hours per week.  Id.  
Sullivan and Coltrane claim that women doubled the amount of time spent in “childcare and 
interaction with children” between 1965 and 2003.  Sullivan and Coltrane, supra note 182.  This 
discrepancy is most likely due to a different definition of “childcare,” which can range from feeding 
and carpooling to cuddling and nurturing. 
 184.  See Pear, supra note 180. 
 185.  See, e.g., Women Have More Intense Emotions than Men When Conflict Arises Within the Couple, 
2011 PSYCHOL. & PSYCHIATRY J. 300 (discussing a study conducted by Inmaculada Valor Segura, 
Francisca Exposito and Miguel Moya of the Department of Social Psychology, University of Granada, 
Spain). 
 186.  Id. at 300. 
 187.  Kristin L. Croyle & Jennifer Waltz, Emotional Awareness and Couples’ Relationship Satisfaction, 
28 J. MARITAL & FAM. THERAPY 435, 441 (2002).  The authors noted that in contrast to their own study, 
another study had shown that women had greater emotional awareness in general compared to men 
as a group, rather than only in relation to their partners.  They hypothesized that either sample sizes 
or the different methods of gathering data might have accounted for the more limited gender 
difference in their own study.  Id. at 441–42. 
 188.  See, e.g., Mohr, supra note 169, at 394 (citing Rand D. Conger et al., Husband and Wife 
Differences in Response to Undesirable Life Events, 34 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 71 (1993) (finding that 
married women were more likely than their husbands to be upset by negative family events like 
marital separation or illness)); Susan Nolen-Hoeksema, Judith Larson & Carla Grayson, Explaining the 
Gender Difference in Depressive Symptoms, 77 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1061 (1999) (finding that 
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ruminate over negative events tends to generate greater negative feelings in 
women than men.189  Lastly, many psychologists believe women (more than 
men) are socialized to judge their own value in relation to the success of their 
interpersonal relationships and experience a loss of self-esteem if those 
relationships falter.190 
ii. Guilt-Ridden Mamas 
The tendency of women to experience more intense emotions and a greater 
sense of responsibility for the success of family relationships may account for the 
fact that women appear to be especially prone to feelings of guilt and shame over 
failure to attain the ideal of the perfect mother.191  Over the past century, social 
expectations of women have grown so that many women feel pressured to excel 
in competing workplace and home roles.192  The modern American ideal of 
motherhood encourages women to obsessively seek perfection in their children’s 
meals, toys, play groups, schools (beginning as early as preschool), and sports.193  
Studies show that mothers spend more time with their children than they did a 
generation ago even though greater numbers of those same women today work 
in paid employment as well.194  Although women devote greater amounts of time 
and energy to mothering than ever before, messages from experts, promulgated 
by the media, leave many mothers feeling stressed, guilty, and inadequate.195  
Social pressure to be a perfect mother may lead many married women to make 
the risky economic decision to forgo paid employment and stay home with their 
children.  If their marriages subsequently end in divorce, women may feel guilt 
and shame over their now vulnerable financial situations and the need to return 
to paid employment rather than remain at home with their children. 
While couples no longer marry primarily for economic security, and 
 
women were more likely to experience symptoms of depression when there were chronic household 
or interpersonal strains)). 
 189.  Mohr, supra note 169, at 397 (discussing research by Suls, Green & Hillis which suggests that 
“negative events may affect women’s mood over the course of hours, not days”). 
 190.  For example, one study showed that despite fairly widespread societal acceptance of 
divorce, some women have the experience of being deserted by friends or family.  “Many women 
believed they were the source of the problem, experienced feelings of guilt, felt like a failure, became 
depressed, and developed physical ailments, such as headaches and eating disorders.  Lacking 
support, the women turned emotions inward and experienced a lack of self-esteem.”  Cindy Thomas 
& Marilyn Ryan, Women’s Perception of the Divorce Experience: A Qualitative Study, 49 J. DIVORCE & 
REMARRIAGE 210, 220 (2008). 
 191.  See, e.g., SUSAN J. DOUGLAS & MEREDITH W. MICHAELS, THE MOMMY MYTH: THE 
IDEALIZATION OF MOTHERHOOD AND HOW IT HAS UNDERMINED ALL WOMEN (2005); Emma-Kate 
Symons, Mama, You’re on Her Mind, THE AUSTL., June 12, 2010, available at 
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/features/mama-youre-on-her-mind/story-e6frg6z6-
1225878423523 (discussing French feminist Elisabeth Badinter’s LE CONFLIT LA FEMME ET LA MERE, a 
work criticizing social pressure on women to be perfect mothers). 
 192.  See, e.g., ARLIE RUSSELL HOCHSCHILD & ANNE MACHUNG, THE SECOND SHIFT (Penguin Books 
2003) (1989). 
 193.  See generally DOUGLAS & MICHAELS, supra note 191. 
 194.  See, e.g., HOCHSCHILD & MACHUNG, supra note 192. 
 195.  See, e.g., DOUGLAS & MICHAELS, supra note 191, at 5–9 (describing “the new momism” in 
which media promulgates the view that mothers must perfectly manage every aspect of their 
children’s lives or risk disaster). 
McMullen_Paginated (Do Not Delete) 3/13/2012  10:14 AM 
64 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY Volume 19:41 2011 
spouses no longer expect such security in the event of a divorce, women often 
continue to put themselves in economically vulnerable situations by reducing or 
giving up their participation in the paid labor force.  Many unique variables are 
at play.  At the very least, women with children need to take maternity leave 
because of biological realities.196  Couples may decide it is more economically 
efficient for one spouse to work and for the other to leave the job track altogether 
and stay home, but this comes with distinct career advancement and economic 
risks.197  As columnist Ellen Goodman notes: “[w]e still haven’t made work bend 
to the arc of life and love.  Nor have we made it easy to opt back into the 
workforce after you opt out.”198 
Additionally, for significant numbers of women, even in the face of a high 
divorce rate, no individual believes going into a marriage that divorce will 
happen to her.199  Married couples typically enter marriage with the optimistic 
expectation of sharing their lives permanently.200  This sharing includes 
economic and social resources with both spouses engaging in home and market 
labor in collaborative ways for the good of the family.201  At a certain point, some 
women opt out of the paid workforce to reduce the competing demands and to 
assuage the feelings of guilt and shame associated with leaving their children in 
the care of others.202 
Consider a series of posts on Lisa Belkin’s popular New York Times blog, 
Motherlode.203  Anna, a woman with a three-month-old baby, writes asking the 
advice of other blog readers about her desire to scale back her career so as to 
spend more time with her new baby.204  Many Motherlode readers posted 
suggestions, as well as expressions of support, for Anna’s desire to remain home 
with her baby.205  More than four hundred postings offered advice, but only a 
small percentage cautioned Anna to consider what leaving the workforce would 
do to her financial prospects in the event of the end of her marriage through 
death or divorce.206  In a later post, Anna wrote that her employer rejected her 
 
 196.  Recovery time from childbirth varies depending on an individual’s health, type of delivery, 
and any complications, but since a postpartum doctor’s checkup is typically scheduled for six weeks 
after the birth, it seems reasonable that at least that amount of time would be typical for significant 
(but not necessarily total) physical recovery.  See, e.g., U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH, Pregnancy: Recovering 
from Birth, Women’s Health, http://www.womenshealth.gov/pregnancy/childbirth-
beyond/recovering-from-birth.cfm. 
 197.  See generally BENNETTS , supra note 126. 
 198.  Ellen Goodman, Desperate Ex-Housewives, BOS. GLOBE, Jan. 6, 2006, at A17. 
 199.  Alicia Brokars Kelly, Money Matters in Marriage: Unmasking Interdependence in Ongoing 
Spousal Economic Relations, 47 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 113, 121 (2008). 
 200.  Id. 
 201.  Id. at 126–27. 
 202.  See discussion infra Part III.A.ii.  See also PAMELA STONE, OPTING OUT?   WHY WOMEN REALLY 
QUIT CAREERS AND HEAD HOME (2007).  Popular culture is replete with tales of women who have 
made just such a choice.  See, e.g., ALLISON PEARSON, I DON’T KNOW HOW SHE DOES IT (2002). 
 203.  See generally Lisa Belkin, N.Y. TIMES MOTHERLODE, http://parenting.blogs.nytimes.com. 
 204.  Lisa Belkin, Scaling Back Career for Baby, N.Y. TIMES MOTHERLODE (July 6, 2009, 12:00 PM), 
http://parenting.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/07/06/asking-a-boss-for-a-part-time-schedule/. 
 205.  Id. 
 206. Id.  Of the 427 comments I counted, only thirteen mentioned the possibility of a future 
divorce as a consideration over whether to leave a job.  Fourteen comments mentioned that 
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proposal to work part time, so Anna quit her job to be home with her baby.207 
The positive response by many blog readers to Anna’s decision to remain at 
home with her baby reflects the pattern shared by many married couples: each 
spouse makes different contributions to the family at different points in time.208  
Despite patterns of work that are different, and sometimes unequal, the 
allocation of duties is likely to be regarded as fair by the spouses, at least while 
the marriage continues.209  In particular, the decision to have the woman stay 
home to engage primarily in child care may be seen as economically rational 
since the woman is often the lower-earning spouse in the marketplace,210 and 
freedom from the constraints of juggling childcare and paid work may improve 
the husband’s career success. 
However, when one spouse remains at home, the actual impact on the 
marital relationship is complicated.211  Although the stay-at-home mother is 
presumably the primary caretaker of the children, her husband is likely to be 
more involved in the lives of those children than fathers were in previous 
generations.212  As mentioned previously, over the past few decades men have, 
on average, increased the amount of time and energy they devote to family 
activities.213  At the same time, many mothers who are staying home with the 
children are considered to be engaged in paid labor even if they only work a few 
hours for pay, and thus they are typically not on par with their husbands in 
terms of either time spent in paid employment or income earned there.214  Thus, 
the idealized notion of separate-but-equal home and marketplace spheres (a 
notion popular in the 19th century as well as in the 1950s)215 is somewhat 
blurred. 
Although notions of marriage as an equal social and economic relationship 
are popular, there are indications that gender equality is not complete during 
most marriages, especially ones in which the distribution of wage earning and 
childcare are unbalanced.216  The higher earning partner (usually the husband) 
 
remaining in the workforce was a good idea in case something happened to the husband or to his job.  
A more robust fifty-five comments mentioned the serious long-term career disadvantages to 
dropping out of the paid workforce.  Some comments mentioned more than one risk.  Comments to 
Belkin, Scaling Back Career for Baby, supra note 204. 
 207.  Lisa Belkin, Quitting a Job to Raise a Child, N.Y. TIMES MOTHERLODE (July 15, 2009, 4:24 PM), 
http://parenting.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/07/15/resigning-to-raise-a-child/. 
 208.  Kelly, supra note 199, at 129–30. 
 209.  Id. (citing Steven L. Nock, Time and Gender in Marriage, 86 VA. L. REV. 1971, 1977 (2000)). 
 210.  See infra Part III.B. 
 211.  See, e.g., Sullivan & Coltrane, supra note 182. 
 212.  Id.  See also, Pear, supra note 180. 
 213. See Sullivan & Coltrane, supra note 182. 
 214. See ANN CRITTENDON, THE PRICE OF MOTHERHOOD: WHY THE MOST IMPORTANT JOB IN THE 
WORLD IS STILL THE LEAST VALUED 18 (2001).  A woman only needs to work one hour per year in 
order to be counted for statistical purposes as employed outside the home.  Id. 
 215. See id. at 47–49 (discussing the separate spheres of work and home in the 19th century).  See 
also STEPHANIE COONTZ, THE WAY WE NEVER WERE: AMERICAN FAMILIES AND THE NOSTALGIA TRAP, 
23–41 (1992) (describing traditional stay-at-home mothers and working fathers in the 1950s and how 
that model has been idealized ever since). 
 216.  CRITTENDON, supra note 214, at 111–15. 
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may have greater decision-making power in the family.217  When one partner is 
earning little or no money, the power imbalance may be even more skewed. 
In a divorce, the legal system colludes in devaluing the non-market 
contributions of the party who is primarily engaged in home and childcare labor, 
which is traditionally labeled “women’s work.”218  The current system clearly 
expects that the former stay-at-home mothers will return to paid employment 
and that they will become self-supporting as soon as possible.219  As previously 
discussed, this is not necessarily a realistic scenario because of employment 
disadvantages stemming from interrupted employment.220 
Moreover, wives may experience guilt and shame over their lost earning 
power or over the marriage failure.221  A decision to reduce or forgo outside 
employment in order to care for the children, once perceived as an unselfish 
contribution to the family, might at the time of separation appear to the wife as 
something she did that led inexorably to the divorce.222  The rise of guilt 
experienced by women with children has been exacerbated over the past several 
decades by a phenomenon often referred to as “The Mommy Wars.”223  In 
debates that appear in print, in person, and on talk radio and television, 
emotions run high over whether women with children, especially pre-school age 
children, should engage in paid employment outside of the home.224  Proponents 
of stay-at-home mothering claim that children are better off if mom stays home 
with them full time and are seriously disadvantaged in terms of health, 
happiness, and future development if she does not.225  Proponents of working 
mothers claim that children are better off if there is adequate income for the 
family and if their mothers are happy and fulfilled—a state that not every 
woman can achieve while remaining at home full time.226  Moreover, advocates 
for working mothers claim that children actually benefit from the employment of 
their mothers because they have greater independence and the advantage of the 
mother as a role model.227 
Two aspects of “The Mommy Wars” are relevant to the discussion of 
alimony.  First, there has been an important change to the terminology.228  Today 
it is rare to hear anyone refer to the wife at home as a “housewife;” the preferred 
 
 217.  Id. 
 218.  Kelly, supra note 199, at 144. 
 219.  HARRIS, TEITELBAUM & CARBONE, supra note 31, at 457–58. 
 220.  See supra text accompanying notes 130–140. 
 221.  See supra Part III.A. 
 222.  See, e.g., BENNETTS, supra note 126, at 59 (describing a woman who quit her job as a lawyer to 
stay home but feels worried and guilty about the stress on her husband who now has the entire 
“huge burden” of supporting the family). 
 223.  See, e.g., DOUGLAS & MICHAELS, supra note 191, at 12–13. 
 224.  See generally Laura Schlessinger, Dr. Laura’s Blog, DR.LAURA.COM, www.drlaurablog.com/, 
(last updated Oct. 7, 2011).  But see CHIRA, supra note 115, at 259–63. 
 225.  A leading proponent of this view is Dr. Laura Schlessinger, a radio host known for 
castigating female callers who do not stay home full-time to raise their children.  See generally 
Schlessinger, supra note 224. 
 226.  CHIRA, supra note 115, at 259–63. 
 227.  See, e.g., id. 
 228.  Id. at 18. 
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term has become a “stay-at-home mother.”229  The implication is that the decision 
to stay home is tied to the existence of children living at home, and the corollary 
is that when the children leave home, the mother is free to work outside the 
home.  Second, the rhetoric, while extolling the virtues of all child rearing and 
homemaking, emphasizes that crucial period when children are pre-school 
age.230  Once children are in school, there is no philosophical reason to demand 
that their mothers remain at home.  In a nation where the norm is two children 
per family, and many school districts provide 4-year-old kindergartens, this will 
likely result in only five to ten years where even the staunchest proponent of 
staying home for the good of the children is adamant that a mother must be at 
home with her children.231  In fact, with expensive sports camps, private music or 
dance lessons, and ever-rising college costs, it could be argued that returning to 
at least part-time paid employment is for the benefit of the children.  This does 
present quite a conundrum for mothers: staying home provides their children 
with certain benefits, but many children also benefit from increased family 
income.  Staying home with the children is likely a temporary phase for many 
women, with the possible exception of the most religiously traditional and the 
most economically privileged.232  Yet, as we have seen, even a temporary 
departure from paid employment can cause severe economic disadvantages.233  
The question then becomes how women expect those disadvantages to be 
apportioned in the event of a divorce. 
In an online essay entitled “Stay-At-Home Parenting After Divorce,” Amber 
Hinds argues that if the spouses agree that mom staying home is best for the 
children, this agreement should be upheld even in the face of divorce because 
divorce does not change the belief that the kids are best off with one parent at 
home.234  Comments posted by readers were split in response.  Many online 
commenters responded that divorce changes everything and that the extra 
expenses of supporting two households preclude one parent from staying at 
home in all but the most economically privileged households.235  Some 
commenters argue that divorce, like death or job loss, is a foreseeable risk, and it 
is in the interest of any children for their mother to provide for such risks by 
remaining employed or at least readily employable.236  Other commenters 
applaud the notion that divorced mothers remain at home raising their 
 
 229.  Id. 
 230.  See, e.g., id. at 17 (relating that many advocate that mothers stay home with their children 
but, if necessary, can work part-time once their children are in school). 
 231.  Of course, parents who opt to homeschool their children voluntarily lengthen the time when 
a parent must be at home, but there is nothing about placing a high value on stay-at-home mothering 
that requires homeschooling. 
 232.  “Women with high-earning husbands obviously have more options than those who are 
struggling merely to survive.” BENNETTS, supra note 126, at 30. 
 233.  Supra text accompanying notes 130–39. 
 234.  Belkin, Divorce and the Stay-at-Home-Mom, supra note 68. 
 235.  See, e.g., noel, Comment to Belkin, supra note 68; SarahB, Comment to Belkin, supra note 68; 
J.Lee, Comment to Belkin, supra note 68; AMNY, Comment to Belkin, supra note 68. 
 236.  See, e.g., Fiona, Comment to Belkin, supra note 68; Mouse, Comment to Belkin, supra note 68; 
D.J, Comment to Belkin, supra note 68; katehem, Comment to Belkin, supra note 68. 
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children.237  Still others lamented the economic folly of a woman who is the 
mother of six children dropping out of the paid workforce and putting herself in 
a position where she cannot support her family.238 
Women who face divorce after having opted to stay home with the children 
may experience guilt and shame over the marriage failure, as well as guilt and 
shame over getting themselves into a financially vulnerable situation that is 
judged harshly by friends and relatives who share some of the more critical 
views posted in reaction to Hinds’ essay.  This provides another possible 
rationale for women entering settlement agreements that allow for little or no 
alimony. 
iii. The Guilt of Divorce Initiation 
Divorce also triggers guilt and shame when the person who initiates the 
divorce feels guilty not just over the failure of the marriage, but also over the act 
of initiating the legal end of the marriage.239  Psychological studies consistently 
show strong feelings of guilt experienced by the divorce initiator, defined by the 
literature as “the spouse who first proposes the divorce and is firmer in its 
pursuit.”240  Studies show that initiators tend to feel guilty while non-initiators 
feel rejected.241 
Women, the usual recipients of alimony, may be at especially high risk for 
feelings of guilt incident to a divorce because women are statistically much more 
likely to be the divorce initiators.242  Most studies show that women initiate 
divorce at twice the rate of men.243  Since divorce involves separation and 
initiating it is “a willful departure,” initiating divorce may cause separation guilt 
similar to the guilt experienced by young children who must psychologically 
break away from parents who cling to them in an unhealthy way.244 
Psychologists identify this guilt, which includes a tendency to self-punish, 
 
 237.  See, e.g., Alexis, Comment to Belkin, supra note 68; Catherine, Comment to Belkin, supra note 
68. 
 238.  See, e.g., Mouse, Comment to Belkin, supra note 68; Liz Delaney, Comment to Belkin, supra 
note 68. 
 239.  Baum, supra note 158, at 47. 
 240. Id.  “Myers (1989), a psychiatrist who studied the male experience in divorce, suggests that 
men feel guilty when they initiate the divorce: for no longer loving their wives and for wanting to 
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AND DIVORCE (1989); ROBERT E. EMERY, RENEGOTIATING FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS: DIVORCE, CHILD 
CUSTODY, AND MEDIATION (1994)). 
 241. Baum, supra note 158, at 48.  See also CONSTANCE R. AHRONS & ROY H. RODGERS, DIVORCED 
FAMILIES: A MULTIDICIPLINARY DEVELOPMENTAL VIEW 62 (1987). 
 242.  Baum, supra note 158, at 48. 
 243.  Id. 
 244.  Id. at 49 (citing Arnold H. Modell, The Origin of Certain Forms of Pre-oedipal Guilt and the 
Implications for a Psychoanalytic Theory of Affects, 52 INT’L J. PSYCHOANALYSIS 337–46 (1971); Arnold 
Modell, On Having the Right to a Life: An Aspect of the Superego’s Development, 46 INT’L J. 
PSYCHOANALYSIS 323–31 (1965)). 
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as a pattern that may originate in childhood if a child is led by dysfunctional 
parents to believe that the child’s normal independence has somehow harmed 
the parent.245  In response, a child might act in a self-destructive way to either 
maintain ties with the parent or try to comply with that parent’s wishes.246  
Joseph Weiss studied the phenomenon of separation guilt.247  Although he and 
other psychologists specifically addressed it in the context of feelings 
experienced by children (both young or adult) toward their parents, a similar 
pattern may emerge between divorcing spouses.248  Guilt over initiating the 
divorce may lead the party to take actions that are self-punishing or otherwise 
not in his or her best interest. 
Judith S. Wallerstein and Joan B. Kelly, researchers who have done 
empirical studies of divorcing families, found that the parent who chose to 
terminate the marriage was more likely to ask for less if it was the wife or, in the 
husband’s case, was more inclined to financial largesse in child support or 
alimony settlement.249  Hallmarks of separation guilt, such as continuing 
emotional ties out of guilt or acting to appease the injured party, are often 
evident in divorce situations.250  For example, in the context of financial disputes 
in a divorce, maintaining or increasing ties to the injured party might entail 
agreeing to pay alimony, which continues a financial interdependence.  
Complying in a self-tormenting way with the injured party’s real or imagined 
wishes might entail either paying alimony (if the guilt-ridden spouse is the 
primary wage earner) or forgoing alimony (if the guilt-ridden spouse is the 
financially disadvantaged partner). 
Nonetheless, it should be noted that divorce initiation as a source of guilt in 
women appears to be more likely among younger women because research 
shows that women over age forty-five are less likely to initiate divorce than are 
younger women, probably because women in their mid-forties and older have 
fewer prospects for remarriage and are likely to be more dependent on their 
husbands’ income.251  These women know that they are likely unable to support 
themselves at the marital standard of living after having been partly or entirely 
supported by their husbands for such a long period of time.252  Older women are 
less likely to initiate divorce and are thus less likely to experience the guilt one 
may feel as a result of initiating divorce proceedings. 
 
 245.  Joseph Weiss, Unconscious Guilt, in THE PSYCHOANALYTIC PROCESS: THEORY, CLINICAL 
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 246.  Id. at 51. 
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 250.  See Catherine Groves Peele, Social and Psychological Effects of the Availability and the Granting of 
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iv. Women’s Patterns of Behavior in Settlement Negotiations and Mediation 
Most likely, the feelings of guilt and shame experienced by women during 
the divorce process exacerbate the gender-based differences in the negotiating 
behaviors of those women.  Women who have feelings of guilt and shame over 
becoming economically dependent on a man may be less forceful in negotiating 
for continued support.  They may believe that they do not deserve alimony or 
that getting an award of alimony is a hopeless endeavor. 
A final factor in the dwindling numbers of alimony awards is the different 
perspective women bring to the divorce bargaining process.  Some researchers, 
such as Carol Gilligan, claim that women often bring different values into 
negotiations, and that these values may disadvantage women under certain 
circumstances.253  Gilligan argues that women resolve conflict in human 
relationships by focusing on care of others rather than by focusing on justice.254  
Other scholars agree that this preference for cooperation and for care of others 
disadvantages women in negotiation settings, such as divorce settlement 
negotiations, presumably because women seem more likely to sacrifice economic 
advantages in furtherance of non-monetary goals.255  For example, women 
frequently agree to poor settlement terms in order to gain custody of their 
children.256  Women, more than men, treat relational issues and interpersonal 
goals as more important than the goal of achieving specific outcomes in 
negotiations.257  Women’s lack of social power relative to men, as well as 
women’s tendencies to live up to social expectations that they will be nice and 
non-aggressive, may also adversely impact the outcomes for women.258 
Recent research in the context of salary negotiations illustrates important 
differences between the way women and men bargain.259  In a series of 
experiments, Laura J. Kray and Michele J. Gelfand demonstrate that when a first 
offer is accepted in a negotiation, women tend to be more relieved than men.260  
Additionally, in employment negotiations, women emphasize goals of enhancing 
or maintaining personal relationships to a greater degree than men.261  These 
experiments also show that women tend to be more sensitive to clarity, or lack of 
clarity, in negotiating norms, and women are more emotionally attuned than 
 
 253.  CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN’S 
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 254.  Id. at 105.  “Women [see] moral dilemmas in terms of conflicting responsibilities. . .The 
sequence of women’s moral judgment proceeds from an initial concern with survival to a focus on 
goodness and finally to a reflective understanding of care as the most adequate guide to the 
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 257.  Wilkinson-Ryan & Small, supra note 255, at 115. 
 258.  Id. at 117–20. 
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men to nuances in negotiation context.262  The studies demonstrate that 
“[w]omen and men experience the bargaining process differently, have different 
beliefs and motivations during negotiations, and are treated differently for the 
exact same behavior by their negotiating counterparts.”263  Women tend to be 
more anxious about the negotiation process than men.264  Women also tend to 
attain less favorable outcomes from negotiations than men.265 
Extrapolating these findings to the divorce context, if women focus on 
caring and preserving relationships, they may be reluctant to rock the boat and 
push for alimony, particularly when there are children from the marriage.  Many 
women will make financial concessions in exchange for custody.266  Further, 
although it is obvious that in the vast majority of cases the existence of minor 
children require the divorcing parents to maintain some kind of relationship in 
order to coordinate placement times and child-related decisions, even adult 
children present situations where it is better for all concerned if the divorced 
partners can relate to each other in a civil manner.267  Family events, such as 
weddings, graduations, and the arrival of grandchildren, all present 
opportunities for contact among members of the extended family, including the 
ex-spouses.  Research such as that by Kray and Gelfand suggests that women 
may be more sensitive to these relationship issues and may temper their 
bargaining accordingly, especially with respect to ambiguous and controversial 
issues such as alimony.268  Conversely, their soon-to-be-ex-husbands may feel 
that it is only just that the husbands be able to sever economic ties with their 
wives who should be able to get jobs and support themselves. 
Moreover, the women in the Kray and Gelfand studies display high 
sensitivity to “negotiating norms” and less regret about having their first offer 
accepted when high ambiguity about the importance and appropriateness of 
bargaining existed.269  Since alimony awards are unpredictable and are not 
clearly supported by society,270 the importance or appropriateness of bargaining 
over alimony is highly ambiguous.  Some studies show that women are less 
likely to achieve favorable negotiation outcomes compared to men when the 
situation is highly ambiguous.271  Negotiations over alimony may be emotional 
and highly contentious, the husband may be angry, and the lawyer may be 
telling the wife that she cannot count on getting an alimony award if she goes to 
court.  Thus, women may follow the patterns described by Kray and Gelfand by 
 
 262.  Id. at 433. 
 263.  Id. at 420. 
 264.  Id. at 429. 
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negotiating anxiously and agreeing readily to the first proposal in order to 
preserve relationships and placate their soon-to-be-ex-spouses, or even their 
lawyers. 
In addition, studies show that the sense of personal entitlement is different 
for women and men, particularly if there is limited information about relative 
value.272  In one study where male and female students were assigned a task and 
then told to pay themselves a fair wage, women worked longer and more 
efficiently but paid themselves less, on average, than the men.273  There is also 
evidence that men tie their salary to their perception of their economic worth, 
while women tie their worth as employees to what the company is willing to 
pay.274  Tess Wilkinson-Ryan and Deborah Small concluded that in the divorce 
settlement context, men value themselves as worth more than women value 
themselves.275  Women tie their self-assessment of worth to what the legal system 
concludes is a woman’s entitlement at the time of divorce.276  Since modern 
divorce law eschews alimony except as a short-term method of rehabilitation or 
retribution, the legal system does not entitle the woman to alimony.  It is 
therefore logical to conclude that many women will conclude that they are 
undeserving of alimony, and thus they will not pursue it.277 
Author Ann Crittenden provides an example of this phenomenon in her 
book “The Price of Motherhood.”278  She describes the case of “Kate,” a mother of 
two whose husband left her for another woman after twenty-five years of 
marriage.279  Originally employed in a high-paying job, Kate had become a stay-
at-home mother.280  Her lawyer and two court-appointed mediators discouraged 
her from seeking alimony, arguing that what her husband “gave” her would be 
sufficient to live on and, further, that no judge would award her alimony.281  
Crittenden quotes Armin Kuder, a prominent Washington D.C. divorce lawyer: 
“[i]f the wife is under fifty, and there are no kids to take care of, and she’s not 
drooling or otherwise totally incompetent, the court will say this person has to 
become self-sufficient.  You can forget long-term alimony.”282  Lawyers often 
discourage a fight for alimony presumably because a woman could end up in a 
worse economic position by expending time and money to pursue alimony when 
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the awards are so unlikely and the litigation costs are so high.283  Thus many 
women, already having a propensity to try to keep everyone happy and now 
facing opposition from their own lawyers as well as their husbands, are likely to 
abandon the pursuit of alimony. 
B. Men, Marriage, Guilt, and Alimony 
Certainly, divorcing husbands also often experience guilt over their failed 
marriages.  In the past, some men paid alimony out of guilt, at least in cases 
where the husband felt responsible for abandoning the marriage or where the 
children were experiencing financial hardship while in the custody of their 
mothers.284  Nevertheless, this pattern of male guilt appears less common at this 
point in history.285  Alimony now seems less essential to the continued well-being 
of women and children due to the rise of two-income families and the 
accompanying shift in gender roles, especially with respect to the parenting of 
children.  The sharing of parental responsibilities during and after marriage 
makes self-support by both spouses after divorce both possible and expected.286  
Thus, social and legal trends push toward the goal of complete post-divorce 
financial separation of the spouses.287 
Today’s divorcing husband is often less susceptible to guilt while his ex-
wife may be increasingly susceptible to guilt.  First, the husband is less likely to 
feel that he has caused the divorce and needs to purchase his freedom; the 
concept of no-fault divorce embraces the belief that when a marriage breaks 
down, both spouses share the blame in all but the rarest of cases and it is now 
considered acceptable to end an unhappy marriage.288 
Second, the husband may feel angry that the wife expects any financial 
support at all.  Once the marriage is over, divorcing spouses may be less 
appreciative of each other’s contributions and less likely to recall that the 
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McMullen_Paginated (Do Not Delete) 3/13/2012  10:14 AM 
74 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY Volume 19:41 2011 
division of home and economic labor was most likely a joint decision.289  In 
particular, primary breadwinners may view their spouses as having received a 
free ride.290  In interviews of a sample of divorced fathers, sociologist Terry 
Arendell found that many divorced men devalued family activities performed 
either during or after the marriage by their ex-wives.291  Over a third of the 
sample characterized themselves as doing all the income earning as well as 
taking an equal or nearly equal share in any caretaking activities.292  One man 
characterized his wife as doing “next to nothing,” while he saw himself as 
having and doing all necessary work and family tasks.293  This devaluation of the 
ex-wife’s contributions “help[ed] sustain the perception that, at least in 
retrospect, her economic dependence during marriage had been unfair, as was 
any continued exchange of resources after divorce.”294  Not only were the men 
unwilling to pay alimony, they sometimes balked at child support, which they 
regarded “as a continuation of support for the undeserving former spouse.”295  
Far from feeling guilty about the divorce, the majority of the men in the study 
felt angry at the infringement of their rights by their ex-wives whom they saw as 
aided and abetted by the legal system.296 
This research is consistent with studies finding that men tend to value their 
economic worth in terms of their abilities (rather than what the system would 
give them), and that men have a higher sense of entitlement to economic rewards 
than do women.297  Indeed, since married men tend to have higher incomes than 
married women, men “anchor” their expectations for divorce outcomes to this 
marketplace information about their relative worth.298 
Third, in a society where the majority of women work outside of the home 
and their wages and opportunities are on the rise, many men will not feel guilty 
for refusing to pay alimony and forcing their wives to support themselves.  
Furthermore, a husband may believe that paying alimony to an ex-wife will 
greatly impede his ability to remarry and support a new family, an outcome 
viewed by society as both likely and desirable.299  Indeed, Professor Robert W. 
Kelso notes that as early as the 1930s, society increasingly viewed alimony as 
something that might be necessary to support a needy ex-wife (at least until her 
remarriage) but that alimony should no longer “be used as an instrument with 
 
 289.  See Kelly, supra note 199, at 124–25 (demonstrating that couples make these decisions 
jointly). 
 290.  Terry Arendell, The Social Self as Gendered: A Masculinist Discourse of Divorce, 15 SYMBOLIC 
INTERACTION 151, 161 (1992). 
 291.  Id. 
 292.  Id. 
 293.  Id. 
 294.  Id. 
 295.  Id. at 162. 
 296.  Id. 
 297.  See supra text accompanying notes 272–77. 
 298.  Wilkinson-Ryan & Small, supra note 255, at 127–28. 
 299.  See Penelope E. Bryan, Killing Us Softly: Divorce Mediation and the Politics of Power, 40 BUFF. L. 
REV. 441, 523 n.196.  Bryan cites “research indicating men’s tendency to abandon social responsibility 
in favor of maximizing their own outcomes and women’s tendency to remain socially responsible to 
those dependent on them.”  Id. 
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which to punish a guilty husband.”300  The husband’s potential guilt would be 
further diminished if his wife initiated the divorce.301  In any event, with 
women’s theoretically greater access to paid employment, support of a “needy 
ex-wife” is temporary until she obtains employment, and such support is often 
considered unnecessary if she already has employment.302 
Fourth, today’s husband need not feel guilty about abandoning his children 
simply because there has been a divorce.  The almost automatic award of 
custody to the mother is a thing of the past, and fathers can utilize every 
opportunity to build significant relationships with their children through joint 
physical custody that may equal or surpass the physical placement time awarded 
to the mother.303  The large percentage of working mothers helps remove any 
stigma that would come to the children of divorce from their mother’s 
employment.  Thus, there is theoretically no need to provide financial support 
for the ex-wife in order to keep the children happy.  Concerns about forcing a 
reduced standard of living on any minor children can be addressed with joint 
legal custody, shared physical placement, or child support payments.304 
Thus, husbands can walk away from their divorces feeling like they are 
continuing their duty as fathers but are entitled to a clean financial break from 
wives who should be able to support themselves.  They may feel some guilt over 
the failed relationship, but they are less likely to feel guilty about financial 
setbacks encountered by their ex-wives. 
IV. A BETTER APPROACH 
Current alimony policies are confusing, inconsistent, and in need of reform.  
Other than maintaining the status quo, there are at least three realistic 
possibilities for change: abolish alimony entirely, require couples entering 
marriage to enter into prenuptial agreements that deal with the issue of alimony, 
or impose formulas for alimony.  Ultimately, the gender differences in emotional 
reactions to divorce and the different bargaining behaviors that are thereby 
generated mandate the adoption of alimony formulas in states that do not 
already have them. 
A. Abolish Alimony 
Abolishing alimony would create certainty as to outcome in the event of a 
 
 300.  Kelso, supra note 23, at 193. 
 301.  Bryan, supra note 299, at 523 n.196.  “[T]he inevitable pain and resultant hostility and 
resentment that accompanies divorce should decrease the husband’s willingness to provide for his 
ex-wife.  The husband’s reluctance to share financial assets with his wife may be worse when she, 
rather than he, initiates the divorce.”  Id. 
 302.  Bryan, supra note 144, at 1213.  “Current law focuses on the wife’s need, resulting in 
decisions in which wives who earn $12,000 to $20,000 a year are found to have no ‘need’ for alimony 
irrespective of their husbands’ ability to pay.”  Id. 
 303.  HARRIS, TEITELBAUM & CARBONE, supra note 31, at 643–44 (stating that some states have a 
preference for joint custody and most states permit it). 
 304.  Of course, child support ends when the child reaches the age of majority, regardless of what 
the mother’s own self-supported standard of living is at that time.  See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 767.511 (West 
2011) (stating that child support payments continue until age eighteen or when the child graduates 
from high school, whichever is later, provided that support ends in any event at age nineteen). 
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divorce.  In recent years, proponents in several states have supported this 
approach and have proposed legislation to limit or prohibit alimony in certain 
circumstances.305  For example, Texas limits alimony awards to couples that have 
been married for more than ten years if one spouse cannot support herself.306  
Similarly, Utah only allows alimony payments for a time period equal to the 
years of the marriage.307  The Massachusetts legislature also recently passed 
legislation to severely limit alimony.308  These states have effectively banned 
alimony in all but specified circumstances. 
An alimony ban might influence earning behavior during marriage.  
Presumably, women would be more cautious about forgoing education or job 
opportunities if they knew with certainty that they would be fully responsible for 
their own support in the event that their marriages end in divorce.  In a classic 
article on the subject, Professor Herma Hill Kay expresses the opinion that law 
and society should not “encourage future couples entering marriage to make 
choices that will be economically disabling for women, thereby perpetuating 
their traditional financial dependence upon men and contributing to their 
inequality with men at divorce.”309  Although Kay acknowledges that there 
might be good reasons for mothers to stay at home with their children, she 
argues that true economic gender equality can only be achieved if family law 
withdraws support for the social norm of a male breadwinner and a female stay-
at-home parent.310  This argument has particular appeal for theorists who see 
marriage and divorce in terms of economic theory where decisions made in the 
context of a family are viewed in terms of economic incentives and 
disincentive.311  Economist Gary Becker pioneered this approach when he used 
economic formulas for efficiency, utility, and other measures to analyze 
marriage, division of labor between spouses, decisions about children, and 
decisions over whether to marry or divorce.312  This purely economic approach, 
however, does not account for the moral dimensions of family decision-
 
 305.  Korey C. Lundin, Committee Studies Spousal Maintenance Awards—Legislation Expected, 31 WIS. 
J. FAM. L. 30, 30–31 (2011). 
 306.  TEX. FAM. CODE § 8.051(2) (2011).  Alimony may also be granted in certain domestic violence 
situations.  Id. 
 307.  UTAH CODE § 30-3-5 (8)(h) (2011). 
 308.  Jack Flynn, Gov. Patrick OKs ‘Sweeping Overhaul’ of Massachusetts Alimony Laws, Sept. 26, 
2011, available at http://www.masslive.com/news/index.ssf/2011/09/ 
gov_patrick_oks_sweeping_overh.html.  See also, Cheryl Wetzstein, States No Longer Wedded to the Idea 
of Alimony for Life, WASH. TIMES, July 28, 2011, available at 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/jul/28/states-no-longer-wedded-to-idea-of-
alimony-for-lif/?page=2&width=100%25&iframe=true&height=100%25/. 
 309.  Herma Hill Kay, Equality and Difference: A Perspective on No-Fault Divorce and Its Aftermath, 56 
U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 80 (1987). 
 310.  Id. 
 311.  See, e.g., Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Selective Recognition of Gender Difference in the Law: Revaluing 
the Caretaker Role, 31 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 1 (2008); Ira Mark Ellman, The Theory of Alimony, 77 CALIF. 
L. REV. 1 (1989); Jana B. Singer, Alimony and Efficiency: The Gendered Costs and Benefits of the Economic 
Justification for Alimony, 82 GEO. L.J. 2423 (1994). 
 312.  GARY S. BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY, (Enlarged ed., 1991) (arguing, among other 
things, that quantifying energy expended by women performing housework and childcare can be 
used in economic formulas to explain women’s lesser investment in market capital and to largely 
explain the earnings differential and gender specific job segregation of men and women). 
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making.313  Similarly, the economic approach ignores gender differences in how 
spouses regard children and the marital relationship.  Women are more child-
oriented, and their caretaking of children is under-valued by society even though 
that caretaking is absolutely crucial to the survival of society itself.314  This 
argument is consistent with research discussing how women tend to be more 
attuned to relationships, more willing to act to further or preserve relationships 
(even when to do so leads to economic disadvantages), and more likely to feel 
guilty when relationships go awry.315  If these patterns are accurate, women 
might well make the same decisions about balancing participation in the 
workforce with childcare, even if they know that alimony would not be available 
to cushion the economic blow of a divorce.  Indeed, there is some evidence that 
this is the case: significant percentages of women with minor children have 
continued to drop out or cut back from the paid work force during the same 
period of time that alimony awards have become less frequent, as well as smaller 
and for shorter durations where awarded at all.316 
Another objection to the systemic abolition of alimony is that it increases the 
power of the primary wage earner when couples bargain for divorce settlements.  
If courts are precluded from awarding alimony even in cases of dire need or 
egregiously exploitive behavior by one spouse, there is less incentive for 
someone to agree to pay alimony through a settlement, even if in exchange for 
some sought-after concession by the opposing party.  After all, the more 
powerful party might still convince a court to order the sought-after concession, 
but the court would lack authority to order alimony. 
Furthermore, such a ban would cause draconian results for divorcing 
spouses who are genuinely without resources.317  Although courts no longer 
favor alimony, it may be a necessary remedy in hardship cases, such as when one 
spouse is disabled and unable to become self-supporting. 
Finally, there may not be public support for a complete ban on alimony.  
According to Ellman and Braver, a significant percentage of the population 
favors alimony in at least some circumstances. 318 
B. Require Notice or Explicit Pre-nuptial Agreement to a Particular Outcome 
Requiring couples to enter prenuptial agreements regarding alimony is 
another possibility.  Such a solution would introduce predictability to the 
 
 313.  Estin, supra note 251, at 527. 
 314.  See generally Mary Becker, Caring for Children and Caretakers, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1495 
(2001). 
 315.  See supra Part III. A.i.–ii. 
 316.  Garrison’s research shows a dramatic drop in alimony awards in New York between 1978 
and 1984, a period of time during which there was a large increase in the number of married women 
in the paid workforce.  See supra text accompanying notes 39–45.  However, 50 percent of such 
women were not in the paid workforce at that time and might have been in need of alimony that they 
did not receive.  Id. 
 317.  For example, a spouse who suffered from a debilitating illness might be unable to work, but 
an outright alimony ban would not allow the court discretion to order alimony for her support even 
if she had used her healthy years to care for her husband and children. 
 318.  See Ellman & Braver, supra note 56.  This preference for alimony was not related to whether 
the person surveyed had ever been divorced.  Id. 
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question of whether a married woman could reasonably expect alimony in the 
event her marriage ends in divorce.  If couples were forced to confront the 
question of alimony before marriage, they might realize that their economic 
decisions could have far-reaching consequences at the point of divorce.  If the 
couple agrees that there will be no alimony, there is more incentive for both to 
remain in the paid workforce.  In any event, it would be hard to argue that, like 
Terry Hekker,319 they were completely blindsided when no alimony was 
awarded. 
One of the main problems with this approach is that, at the time of 
marriage, nobody ever seems to think he or she will ever get a divorce.320  Thus, 
star-struck lovers may willingly agree to waive alimony only to have the waiver 
come back to haunt them later when, for example, the wife has suffered 
diminished job prospects from remaining home with children. 
Additionally, the direction of modern divorce law precludes paternalistic 
insistence on self-protective pre-marital behavior.  Current trends demonstrate a 
preference that divorcing spouses negotiate and reach private settlements 
allocating their assets and allow them considerable latitude in doing so.321  
Requiring a prenuptial agreement is more coercive than usual practice. 
Lastly, prenuptial agreements are given only a presumption of validity in 
many cases and may be set aside in hardship cases, such as when an ex-spouse is 
unable to support herself after a divorce (although even in a true hardship case 
the judge’s discretion makes the outcome uncertain).322  Prenuptial agreements 
could thus be undermined by overly broad exercise of judicial discretion and 
might be ineffective in bringing structure and predictability to alimony awards. 
C. Impose Formulas for Uniformity 
Mandatory formulas for alimony that are similar in form to the mandatory 
formulas for child support are another proposed solution.  Formulas can take 
account of the length of the marriage, the income discrepancy between the 
parties, the number of years one party spent as the primary childcare parent, and 
any other relevant factors.  Several jurisdictions, including some in Michigan, 
Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas, have adopted alimony guideline formulas for 
at least some purposes.323  A review of such guidelines by the American 
Academy of Matrimonial Law (AAML) prior to its 2002 issuance of principles to 
be considered in the award of alimony found that all guidelines in use at that 
time looked to the duration of the marriage and the income of the spouses.324  
 
 319.  See Hekker, supra note 16. 
 320.  See supra Part III.A.ii. 
 321.  Wilkinson-Ryan & Small, supra note 255, at 115. 
 322.  See, e.g., Wisconsin’s statute on marital property agreements. WIS. STAT. §766.58 (9) (a) 
(2011).  “Modification or elimination of spousal support during the marriage may not result in a 
spouse having less than necessary and adequate support, taking into consideration all sources of 
support.”  Id.  §766.58(9)(b) suggests that the court’s discretion to order alimony notwithstanding a 
spousal agreement waiving it is limited to situations where the destitute spouse is eligible for public 
assistance, but a broader interpretation of the court’s powers is also possible. 
 323.  Mary Kay Kisthardt, Re-thinking Alimony: The AAML’s Considerations for Calculating Alimony, 
Spousal Support or Maintenance, 21 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL L. 61, 73–77 (2008). 
 324.  Id. at 78. 
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The AAML’s subsequent proposal offers one example of how an alimony 
formula might work.325  Under that proposal, an amount of alimony to be used as 
a starting point in negotiations would be calculated by subtracting 20 percent of 
the payee’s gross income from 30 percent of the payer’s gross income, with the 
limitation that the payee would not receive more than 40 percent of the 
combined gross income of the parties.326  The model also provides for various 
factors that would justify deviation, including when one spouse is a primary 
caretaker of a dependent child (either a minor or adult), when one spouse has 
received a disproportionate share of property in the divorce, or when one spouse 
is under a court order to make support or debt payments to another party.327  
Although these factors are important considerations, they might take the vast 
majority of divorces out of the proposed starting formula because many divorce 
decrees designate a primary custodial parent or award uneven property 
distributions, and either of those circumstances would justify deviation from the 
formula.328  Additionally, the Principles and Considerations do not specify which 
divorcing spouses will be eligible for alimony but only provide a starting point 
for calculation once eligibility is otherwise determined.329 
Texas offers a more straightforward example of an alimony formula.330  In 
Texas, there is a presumption against alimony, but the law allows alimony in two 
types of cases: where there has been a conviction or deferred adjudication of 
domestic violence or where, in a marriage lasting ten years or more, one spouse 
is not capable of self-support.331  If at least one of these criteria is met, the 
recipient spouse will receive the lesser of $2,500 per month or twenty percent of 
the payer’s average monthly gross income.332  Maintenance payments terminate 
after a maximum of three years, or upon the death, remarriage, or cohabitation of 
the payee spouse, whichever occurs first.333  However, if the payee spouse has a 
permanent physical or mental disability, maintenance may continue 
indefinitely.334  In contrast with the AAML proposal, the Texas guidelines allow 
payment of alimony in far fewer situations, but there are fewer exceptions or 
factors allowing for deviation once the threshold requirements for receiving 
 
 325.  Id. 
 326.  Id. 
 327.  Id. at 78–79.  Other reasons for deviation include one spouse having unusual needs, unusual 
tax consequences, the ages of the spouses, and whether one spouse has given up a career, career 
opportunities, or in some other way supported the career of the other spouse.  Id. 
 328.  Moreover, deviation might not be entirely justified in terms of providing a fair level of 
support for a dependent spouse.  For example, a lower-earning spouse may receive a slightly larger 
share of the marital property than her husband, but it may not be enough to provide her with 
ongoing support until she can achieve the marital standard of living.  See, e.g., In re Marriage of 
LaRoque, 406 N.W.2d 736 (Wis. 1987).  Nonetheless, the unequal property award would constitute a 
disproportionate share of the property, justifying removal of the case from application of the formula. 
 329.  See Kisthardt, supra note 323, at 79. 
 330.  TEX. FAM. CODE §8.051 (2011). 
 331.  Id.  Incapacity for self-support may be due to physical or mental incapacity, lack of earning 
ability in the labor market, or the necessity of providing care and supervision for a disabled child.  Id. 
at §8.051(2). 
 332.  Id. at §8.055. 
 333.  Id. at §§ 8.054(1), 8.056. 
 334.  Id. at § 8.054. 
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alimony have been met.335  This is more desirable because it makes outcomes 
more predictable, and women who are eligible for alimony are less likely to lose 
out on it because they feel too guilty, ashamed, or intimidated to bargain for it. 
Implementation of alimony formulas does have a potential downside: if 
formulas are strictly adhered to, judges could lose discretion to carve out 
solutions that will optimally protect the property and personal interests of each 
unique individual seeking a divorce.  A one-size-fits-all solution may not fit the 
needs of each divorcing couple perfectly.  However, the unequal and sometimes 
unfair results stemming from vague statutes and poorly exercised judicial 
discretion have fallen disproportionately on divorced women with children.336  
Formulas have the advantage of providing a starting point, and if drafted with 
limited possibilities of deviation, formulas can potentially allow dependent 
spouses to count on a minimum level of support. 
Formulas provide predictability while also allowing for flexibility in certain 
circumstances.  Like child support formulas, alimony formulas can be designed 
as strongly presumptive but allow an opportunity for rebuttal of the 
presumption in cases with unusual or compelling circumstances.  With formulas, 
spouses who are in predictably vulnerable economic circumstances, such as long-
term homemakers or stay-at-home mothers with young children, would not be 
forced to bargain aggressively in order to obtain at least temporary alimony if the 
formulas presumed alimony under similar circumstances.  Guilt, shame, or 
gender-based hesitancy to make a good deal would play less of a role in the 
ultimate outcome.  Spousal maintenance formulas may indeed be an idea whose 
time has come. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Social and individual expectations about marriage are highly charged with 
emotion, and these expectations are in some ways contradictory.  This article 
demonstrates that while divorce can be painful and guilt-inducing for both 
partners, women are especially vulnerable to feelings of guilt and shame and are 
particularly likely to act in self-defeating ways in the course of settlement 
negotiations.  Women’s guilt in the divorce context can come from a variety of 
sources, such as a greater emotional vulnerability when facing relationship 
disruptions or guilt over initiating a divorce that may be desired by both 
spouses.  In addition, idealized expectations surrounding motherhood, 
exacerbated by a barrage of perfect-mother media images, contribute to the guilt 
experienced by women whose families are split by divorce.  These factors impact 
whether women seek alimony at all, and they appear to negatively affect the 
women’s ability to bargain effectively on their own behalf.  It may be possible to 
mitigate some of the dire economic impact of divorce on many women by 
implementing state alimony formulas that guarantee alimony awards in cases of 
financial hardship.  Hopefully, however, a simple awareness of the patterns that 
exacerbate unfairness in alimony outcomes will help the family court system 
adjust in ways that allow fairer solutions for ex-spouses as they go on with the 
 
 335.  Id. at §8.051. 
 336.  See supra Part II.A. 
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rest of their lives. 
 
